People v. Brown

JUSTICE TURNER, dissenting:

I respectfully dissent.

I begin by noting that I do not address whether the majority correctly determined that Brown was seized in violation of his fourth amendment rights because, even if the majority is correct, the fruit-of-the-poisonofis-tree doctrine does not extend to suppress Brown’s conduct that formed the basis of his obstructing-justice charges.

The fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine applies where police officers violate a defendant’s fourth amendment rights. The constitutional violation is termed the “poisonous tree,” and any evidence that the State obtains by exploiting that constitutional violation is subject to suppression as the “fruit” of that poisonous tree. McCauley, 163 Ill. 2d at 448, 645 N.E.2d at 940.

However, our supreme court has declined to extend the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence of crimes that arise from and are in reaction to an illegal search or seizure. Abrams, 48 Ill. 2d at 455-57, 271 N.E.2d at 43-44. Specifically, the Abrams court held “that an accused cannot effectively invoke the fourth amendment to suppress evidence of his own unlawful conduct which was in response to police actions in violation of the amendment.” Abrams, 48 Ill. 2d at 455, 271 N.E.2d at 43. Accordingly, the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine does not provide for the suppression of evidence of a defendant’s own unlawful conduct in response to police conduct that was in violation of the fourth amendment. See People v. Santana, 121 Ill. App. 3d 265, 270 , 459 N.E.2d 655, 659 (1984).

Despite Abrams’ explicit holding, the majority writes “[w]e do not believe that the rule established in Abrams should be applied to this case.” 345 Ill. App. 3d at 367. Instead, the majority concludes the “thrust” of Abrams and the subsequent supreme court decision in Villarreal “is clearly the protection of law enforcement officers from people who physically resist unconstitutional searches and seizures.” 345 Ill. App. 3d at 368. The majority then declines “to extend the Abrams rule to cover Brown’s conduct in this case” because “[rjefusing to provide identification does not raise the same policy concerns as assaulting a law enforcement officer.” 345 Ill. App. 3d at 368.

I disagree with the majority’s decision for three reasons. First, while stating it declined to extend Abrams, the majority is actually limiting the holding in Abrams to cases involving protection of law enforcement officers from people who physically resist unconstitutional searches and seizures. As noted, the Abrams court stated that “an accused cannot effectively invoke the fourth amendment to suppress evidence of his own unlawful conduct which was in response to” an illegal search or seizure. Abrams, 48 Ill. 2d at 455, 271 N.E.2d at 43. That language does not limit the defendant’s conduct to acts of physical resistance, and it is not this court’s prerogative to impose such a limit.

Second, the majority’s limitation of Abrams to acts of physical resistance is also inconsistent with our supreme court’s rationale in Abrams. The Abrams court cited with approval Vinyard v. United States, 335 F.2d 176 (8th Cir. 1964), United States v. Perdiz, 256 F. Supp. 805 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), United States v. Troop, 235 F.2d 123 (7th Cir. 1956), and People v. Guillory, 178 Cal. App. 2d 854 , 3 Cal. Rptr. 415 (1960). See Abrams, 48 Ill. 2d at 456-57, 271 N.E.2d at 43-44. Those cases all involved attempted briberies of officers following searches and seizures deemed to have been unlawful. Abrams, 48 Ill. 2d at 456, 271 N.E.2d at 44. The courts all treated the attempted briberies as independent of the unlawful searches and seizures, and our supreme court stated “[w]e consider these refusals to extend the exclusionary rule to have been correct.” Abrams, 48 Ill. 2d at 456-57, 271 N.E.2d at 44. Thus, the majority’s limitation of Abrams to cases involving physical resistance is untenable.

Third, I conclude the majority takes too narrow a view of the “policy concerns” behind the Abrams decision and those at issue in cases such as this. In its analysis, the majority states “[rjefusing to provide identification does not raise the same policy concerns as assaulting a law enforcement officer.” 345 Ill. App. 3d at 368. Initially, I note Brown was not charged with refusing to provide identification but instead is alleged to have provided the police officer with false information, including giving a false name.

The protection of law enforcement officers is clearly a proper policy concern for not extending the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence of physical resistance. Such acts could easily lead to physical harm to police officers or to those who are resisting, and thus justify the limitation on the exclusionary rule. However, the protection of the public is also a relevant policy consideration for not extending the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence of new independent crimes, even if those crimes do not involve acts of physical resistance.

Moreover, the need to protect the public increases with the seriousness of the crime. “As an institution, the legislature is better equipped than the judiciary to identify and remedy the evils confronting our society and is more capable of gauging the seriousness of an offense.” People v. Hill, 199 Ill. 2d 440, 454 , 771 N.E.2d 374, 383 (2002). Accordingly, courts will generally defer to the legislature’s judgment that a particular offense is more serious than another. Hill, 199 Ill. 2d at 454 , 771 N.E.2d at 383 . Here, however, the majority extends the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence of obstructing justice, a Class 4 felony (720 ILCS 5/31 — 4(d)(1) (West 2002)), but fails to appreciate the extension of the rule has already been refused for resisting or obstructing a peace officer, a Class A misdemeanor (720 ILCS 5/31 — 1(a) (West 2002)). See Villarreal, 152 Ill. 2d at 378-79, 604 N.E.2d at 928. By the classification of these offenses, the legislature has determined the act of obstructing justice to be more serious, and presumably, potentially more dangerous, than the act of resisting or obstructing a peace officer.

Also, as previously noted, the supreme court in Abrams approved of the refusal to extend the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence of attempted bribery following police conduct that violated the fourth amendment. The majority’s decision today would require an opposite result because the majority chooses to apply Abrams only to cases involving physical resistance. Thus, evidence of a bribery, a Class 2 felony (720 ILCS 5/33 — 1(f) (West 2002)), and attempt (bribery), a Class 3 felony (720 ILCS 5/8 — 4(c)(4) (West 2002)), would be suppressed despite the seriousness of these offenses. Accordingly, the majority’s limitation of Abrams to cases involving physical resistance is baseless when the legislature has determined certain crimes not involving physical resistance are in fact more serious.

In my view, these different applications of the exclusionary rule are unreasonable as well as unwarranted. Neither our society nor our system of jurisprudence condones unlawful responses to unlawful conduct. Indeed, unlawful responses to unlawful conduct are to be discouraged, and more precisely, deterred to best protect our citizenry. Applying the precise holding of Abrams accomplishes this purpose, while parsing its application to only some criminal offenses does not.

As a final matter, I note the dubious nature of the charge against Brown, i.e., committing the offense of obstructing justice by indicating his name was Tony B. Brown rather than Antonio B. Brown. However, we do not have sufficient facts before us to determine the State’s justification for this charge, and in any event, the posture of this case presents only the issue of whether Brown’s statement should be suppressed. Because I conclude it should not, I would reverse and remand.