holding that to be reasonable, a condition of probation must not be overly broad when viewed in the light of the desired goal or the means to that end or, in other words, "where a condition of probation requires a waiver of precious constitutional rights, the condition must be narrowly drawn; to the extent it is overbroad it is not reasonably related to the compelling state interest in reformation and rehabilitation and is an unconstitutional restriction on the exercise of fundamental constitutional rights." (Citations omitted.)
How later courts described this case
- holding that to be reasonable, a condition of probation must not be overly broad when viewed in the light of the desired goal or the means to that end or, in other words, "where a condition of probation requires a waiver of precious constitutional rights, the condition must be narrowly drawn; to the extent it is overbroad it is not reasonably related to the compelling state interest in reformation and rehabilitation and is an unconstitutional restriction on the exercise of fundamental constitutional rights." (Citations omitted.)
- explaining that âthis court [has] rejected claims that the [sex offender] Registration Act and the Notification Law constitute punishment. We are not persuaded that requiring a juvenile sex offender to register . . . compels a different resultâ
- finding that the registration requirements under SORA “are not punitive” and finding no merit to juvenile offender’s claim that lifetime registration requirement was analogous to the imposition of the death penalty as cruel and unusual punishment
- recognizing that rational basis test does not require that statute be best means of protecting public and that it is up to the legislature and not courts to determine whether statute is best means for achieving desired results
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
JUSTICE FREEMAN joins in this special concurrence.