Opinion

Harrison v. Hardin County Community Unit School District No. 1

  • 197 Ill. 2d 466
  • 259 Ill. Dec. 440
  • 758 N.E.2d 848
  • 2001 Ill. LEXIS 1429
Court
Illinois Supreme Court
Filed
Oct 18, 2001
Status
Published
Author
Harrison
On the bench
Garman, Harrison, Kilbride
Cited by
127 cases
Authority
More cited than 12.0%

finding that a school principal made a policy decision when he had to consider the circumstances surrounding a student’s request to leave school early, balance the student’s desire to leave school early with the school’s interest in an orderly dismissal and the possibility that other students would want to also leave early, and judge how best to perform his duties as a principal

How later courts described this case

  • finding that a school principal made a policy decision when he had to consider the circumstances surrounding a student’s request to leave school early, balance the student’s desire to leave school early with the school’s interest in an orderly dismissal and the possibility that other students would want to also leave early, and judge how best to perform his duties as a principal
  • finding that a principal made a policy decision when declining to dismiss a student early due to inclement weather because he “had to balance the competing interests of [the student’s] desire to leave early before the weather worsened with that of the school’s interest in an orderly dismissal,” among other factors
  • holding, as a matter of law, that the school district was entitled to discretionary immunity
  • noting that courts may "not depart from the plain language of [a statute] by reading into it exceptions, limitations , or conditions that conflict with the express legislative intent" (emphasis added)

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON, specially concurring:

I agree with the result reached by the majority. I do so, however, for reasons other than those stated in the majority opinion.

Based upon the reasons set forth in my dissent in Harinek v. 161 North Clark Street Ltd. Partnership, 181 Ill. 2d 335, 355-56 (1998) (Harrison, J., dissenting), I do not believe that the school district was entitled to immunity under section 2 — 201 of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/2 — 201 (West 1994)), because principal Brumley was not determining policy when he denied Joshua’s request to be dismissed early. However, a reviewing court may affirm a grant of summary judgment on any basis found in the record (see Alliance Syndicate, Inc. v. Parsec, Inc., 318 Ill. App. 3d 590, 599 (2000); Lawrence & Allen, Inc. v. Cambridge Human Resource Group, Inc., 292 Ill. App. 3d 131, 135 (1997)), and I believe that summary judgment was properly granted because uncontradicted evidence advanced in support of the school district’s motion for summary judgment conclusively establishes that the alleged misconduct by the school district did not proximately cause the accident or plaintiffs injuries.

To properly state a cause of action for, willful and wanton conduct, as asserted herein, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant owed a duty of care, that the defendant breached this duty, and that the plaintiff incurred injuries proximately caused by the breach. See Urban v. Village of Lincolnshire, 272 Ill. App. 3d 1087, 1094 (1995); Loco v. City of Chicago, 154 Ill. App. 3d 498, 502 (1987). In its motion for summary judgment, the school district claimed, inter alia, that “[vjiewing the facts as alleged in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the conduct of the School District was not sufficiently closely connected with Plaintiffs injury so that, given considerations of justice or policy, the School District should be held liable for Plaintiffs injury.”

The issue of the existence of proximate cause is ordinarily determined by the trier of fact. Lee v. Chicago Transit Authority, 152 Ill. 2d 432, 454 (1992). However, where the facts are undisputed and reasonable men could not differ as to the inferences to be drawn from those facts, proximate cause may be determined as a matter of law. Merlo v. Public Service Co. of Northern Illinois, 381 Ill. 300, 318 (1942); see also Kimber v. City of Warrenville, 248 Ill. App. 3d 361, 367 (1993). Proximate cause is an issue of material fact in a negligence suit (Gatlin v. Ruder, 137 Ill. 2d 284, 293 (1990); see Meck v. Paramedic Services, 296 Ill. App. 3d 720, 730 (1998)), and where a plaintiff does not present any evidence in reply to counter the facts presented by a defendant in support of a motion for summary judgment on that issue, summary judgment is properly granted (see Kennedy v. Joseph T. Ryerson & Sons, Inc., 182 Ill. App. 3d 914, 919 (1989); see also Purtill, 111 Ill. 2d at 241 (facts contained in an affidavit in support of a motion for summary judgment which are not contradicted by counteraffidavit are admitted and must be taken as true for purposes of the motion)).

Proximate cause encompasses cause in fact and legal cause. Lee, 152 Ill. 2d at 455 . The key inquiry into cause in fact is whether the defendant’s conduct was “a material element and a substantial factor in bringing about the injury.” Lee, 152 Ill. 2d at 455 . The key inquiry into cause in fact is whether the defendant’s conduct was “a material element and a substantial factor in bringing about the injury.” Legal cause is a question of forseeability: a negligent act is a proximate cause of an injury if the injury is of a type that a reasonable person would see as a likely result of his or her conduct. Lee, 152 Ill. 2d at 456 ; see also Williams v. Chicago Board of Education, 267 Ill. App. 3d 446, 451 (1994). If cause in fact is established, the next question is whether the defendant should be held legally responsible for it. See Kimber, 248 Ill. App. 3d at 367 . The test to be applied in all proximate cause cases is whether the first wrongdoer reasonably might have anticipated the intervening efficient cause as a natural and probable result of the first party’s own act or omission. Seith v. Commonwealth Electric Co., 241 Ill. 252, 260 (1909). Even assuming arguendo that the school district’s acts or omissions were a cause in fact of the accident, the evidence establishes that the school district could not reasonably have anticipated the independent acts of Joshua Davis which directly caused the accident and plaintiffs injuries.

Here, where the undisputed facts show that the school district’s conduct was not the legal cause of plaintiff’s injury, summary judgment on this issue is proper as a matter of law. Joshua’s deposition testimony makes clear that the accident which injured plaintiff occurred because, after professing a desire to avoid driving in inclement weather, he made the independent decision to drive past his home and toward the home of his girlfriend, despite the fact that bus transportation was available. The school district and its personnel neither caused Joshua to make that decision, nor reasonably could have foreseen that decision as a likely consequence of their conduct in dismissing Joshua at the same time as the other students who drove to school. Thus, any act or omission committed by the school district would be too remote to be considered a proximate cause of the accident. See Urban, 272 Ill. App. 3d at 1097 , citing Kimber, 248 Ill. App. 3d at 370-71 (where police officer abandoned pursuit, his conduct was too remote to have been a proximate cause of the accident which led to the decedent’s death).

Therefore, one element of plaintiffs claim is lacking where, based on Joshua’s deposition testimony presented by the school district in support of its motion for summary judgment, there remains no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the alleged acts by the school district proximately caused plaintiff’s injury. Joshua’s testimony conclusively demonstrates that he was on the road at the time of the accident because he voluntarily chose to drive his girlfriend and others home.

Based on this analysis, I would hold that the circuit court properly granted summary judgment to the school district.

JUSTICE KILBRIDE joins in this special concurrence.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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