the primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature’s intent and a statute’s language provides the best means of determining the intent of the legislature
How later courts described this case
- the primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature’s intent and a statute’s language provides the best means of determining the intent of the legislature
- where statutory language is ambiguous, courts may consider extrinsic aids for construction, including legislative history, to resolve ambiguity and determine legislative intent
- the severe bodily injury must result from the commission of the Class X or Class 1 felony
- any ambiguity in a penal statute must be construed in the defendant's favor
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
JUSTICE HEIPLE, dissenting:
Section 5 — 8—4(a) of the Unified Code of Corrections authorizes consecutive sentences for offenses which are committed as part of a single course of conduct if “one of the offenses for which defendant was convicted was a Class X or Class 1 felony and the defendant inflicted severe bodily injury.” 730 ILCS 5/5 — 8—4(a) (West 1994). Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and aggravated discharge of a firearm for firing a gun into a car, killing the driver but leaving the passenger uninjured. The trial court imposed consecutive sentences for these offenses because defendant committed a Class 1 felony (aggravated discharge of a firearm) and inflicted severe bodily injury (the shooting of the driver) during a single course of conduct. The majority holds that consecutive sentences are improper in this case because the severe bodily injury did not result directly from the aggravated discharge of a firearm, which is the only Class X or Class 1 felony for which defendant was convicted. 1 Section 5 — 8—4(a), however, imposes no such requirement. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
Even the majority admits that the requirement it reads into section 5 — 8—4(a) does not exist. The majority concedes that “there is no specific reference [in section 5 — 8—4(a)] tying the requirement of severe bodily injury to the Class X or Class 1 felony.” 188 Ill. 2d at 98. The majority’s holding rests solely on the specious proposition that section 5 — 8—4(a) is ambiguous and, therefore, must be construed in favor of defendant. The majority states that section 5 — 8—4(a) is ambiguous because
“[b]oth the interpretation advanced by the State and the interpretation advanced by defendant are reasonable. As noted by the State, there is no specific reference tying the requirement of severe bodily injury to the Class X or Class 1 felony. Nonetheless, it is reasonable to associate the severe bodily injuiy with the Class X or Class 1 felony given its inclusion in the same exception.” (Emphasis added.) 188 Ill. 2d at 98.
Of course it is “reasonable” to associate the severe bodily injury and Class X or Class 1 felony. They are both part of the same exception authorizing consecutive sentences. What is patently unreasonable (and illegitimate) is the majority’s decision to impose an additional requirement that the severe bodily injury must result directly from the commission of the Class X or Class 1 felony.
The language of section 5 — 8—4(a) could not be any clearer. The plain language of section 5 — 8—4(a) requires only that a defendant commit either a Class X or Class 1 felony and inflict severe bodily injury during the same single course of conduct. Had the legislature intended to require that severe bodily injury result directly from the commission of the Class X or Class 1 felony, it would have included such a requirement in the statute.
The majority’s confused statutory construction is understandable because it is clear that the majority’s analysis is guided by what it believes is “reasonable” rather than what the language of the statute actually says. This court has no authority to rewrite statutes to make them consistent with its own idea of reasonableness and sound public policy. See Henrich v. Libertyville High School, 186 Ill. 2d 381, 395 (1998). Such responsibility lies solely with the legislature.
First degree murder is neither a Class X nor Class 1 felony. See 730 ILCS 5/5 — 5—1(b) (West 1994).