The opinion
HUDSON, J.,
Specially Coneurs.
T1 I write separately to emphasize the context in which this case arose, Le., political speech directed to a political actor in the political arena. Appellant sent an email to a state senator urging that a bill be heard, and passed out of, a legislative committee over which the senator presided as chairman. As Judge Lumpkin shows us, the elements of the Oklahoma blackmail statute are not met in this case and Appellant's convictions must be reversed and dismissed. ‘
2 The purported victim in this case is a public figure. But more than that, he is an elected representative in the Oklahoma Legislature. Legislators and other public officials expect to receive "vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks[,]" Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 , 85 S.Ct. 209, 216 , 13 L.Ed.2d 125 (1964) (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 , 84 S.Ct. 710, 721 , 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964)), from the: citizens they represent. That is the nature of elected public office. As Judge Lumpkin's opinion points out, evidence presented at trial show emails similar to the one sent by Appellant were received by the Senator as part of the normal course of legislative business.
8 The First Amendment does not require that constituents be rational, reasonable, kind or even polite in their communications with elected representatives and public officials. The First Amendment does require, however, that the people be heard on matters of public interest without threat of prosecution. Communications like the email at issue in this case receive the broadest possible First Amendment protections because they focus on citizen-led political change through the legislative process. The First Amendment guarantees "the freedom of speech ... [and] the right of the people ... to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." These rights are "implicit in [tlhe very idea ° of government, republican in form'" McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 482 , 105 S.Ct. 2787, 2789 , 86 LEd.2d 384 (1985) (quoting United States v. Cruikshank, 2 Otto 542 , 92 U.S. 542 , 23 L.Ed. 588 (1876)). The right to petition government officials was included in the First Amendment along with the guaran-tes of freedom of speech and freedom of press "to ensure the growth and preservation of democratic self-governance." +Id., 472 U.S. at 489 , 105 S.Ct. at 2798 (Brennan, J., concurring). concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government." Id. (quoting Garrison, 379 U.S. at 74-75 , 85 S.Ct. at 216 ). *1202 "The First and Fourteenth Amendments embody our 'profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials'" Garrison, 379. U.S. at 45, 85 S.Ct. at 216 (quoting Syllivan, 376 U.S. at 270 , 84 S.Ct. at 721 ). .
T4 In this case, Appellant sought with his email merely to get a bill heard and passed out of a legislative committee. Appellant's email does not amount to blackmail under Oklahoma law. Rather, it represents legitimate political activity. We must never allow the Oklahoma blackmail statute to become a sword used to suppress mere political speech or communications of this type with elected public officials. The First Amendment forbids it, especially when the message-or the messenger-are unpopular or controversial. See Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 340 , 130 S.Ct. 876, 898 , 175 LEd.2d 753 (2010) '("Premised on mistrust of governmental power, the First Amendment stands against attempts to disfavor certain subjects or viewpoints."). I therefore concur in reversing and dismissing Appellant's convictions.