holding that the defendant was not prejudiced by the failure to give a multiple conspiracy instruction because he was the only defendant tried and was an “integral participant” in each conspiracy, he was not surprised by the introduction of evidence of the different conspiracies, and “the different conspiracies were clearly delineated chronologically”
How later courts described this case
- holding that the defendant was not prejudiced by the failure to give a multiple conspiracy instruction because he was the only defendant tried and was an “integral participant” in each conspiracy, he was not surprised by the introduction of evidence of the different conspiracies, and “the different conspiracies were clearly delineated chronologically”
- holding that even though a variance occurred where evidence of two separate conspiracies was introduced, the variance did not warrant reversal because the defendant “was an integral participant in these other conspiracies”
- reversing, in part, where the claimant’s global 9 assessment of functioning scores and a “diagnosis describing Claimant as ‘seriously 10 mentally ill’ went unmentioned in the ALJ’s decision[,]” and holding, citing Vincent, that 11 the ALJ must “‘explain why significant probative evidence has been rejected.’”
- plaintiff’s 15 belief of having “no choice in signing [a release] in view of the economic benefits offered 16 and the risk of economic hardship if she declined the offer” did not alone invalidate the 17 release, “because this kind of threat is ‘an accepted part of the bargaining process’”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
ALICE M. BATCHELDER, Chief Judge,
concurring.
I join the lead opinion, but I write separately to note that I do not agree that the district court failed to give sufficient consideration to Goffs personal history and characteristics — or, for that matter, the other factors — under 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (a). As the lead opinion concedes, we do not require a “ritual incantation” of these factors. Rather, as we have repeatedly held, “[wjhile the district court need not engage in a ritualistic incantation to establish consideration of a legal issue or make specific findings related to each of the factors considered, the district court must articulate the reasons it reached the sentence imposed.” United States v. Petrus, 588 F.3d 347, 353 (6th Cir.2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also United States v. Simmons, 587 F.3d 348, 359 (6th Cir.2009) (holding that a “terse” analysis using “generic language” and lacking “elaboration” is not “per se inadequate”). I do not dispute that here, the sentencing judge was terse, and that he did not engage in elaboration. But his explanation to the defendant followed an explicit and detailed description by the government of each of the § 3553(a) factors, and the judge himself mentioned each of the factors and, albeit without elaboration, told the defendant how they figured in the sentence. In my view that is enough.