stating that in both jury and bench trials, the reviewing court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict in order to determine whether any rational fact-finder could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt
How later courts described this case
- stating that in both jury and bench trials, the reviewing court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict in order to determine whether any rational fact-finder could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt
- observing that “the statutory definition of ‘intent’ [in Section 6.03(a) of the Penal Code] contains no provision for circumstances surrounding conduct, unlike the definitions [in Sections 6.03(b) and (c)] of knowledge and recklessness”
- holding that a sex offender’s failure to register offense is a "circumstances-of-conduct” crime and the gravamen of the offense is the duty to register
- concluding failure to register as sex offender is “circumstances of conduct” offense requiring proof of culpable mental states of knowledge or recklessness only on duty-to-register element of offense
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Alcala, J.,
filed a concurring opinion,
in which Meyers, Johnson, and Richardson, JJ., joined.