stating that "the damage must be a 'direct' result of the defendant’s criminal offense — that is, the State must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the loss was a 'but for' result of the criminal offense and resulted ‘proximately,’ or foreseeably, from the criminal offense.”; State failed to establish that damage to light pole was caused by defendant’s intoxicated driving
How later courts described this case
- stating that "the damage must be a 'direct' result of the defendant’s criminal offense — that is, the State must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the loss was a 'but for' result of the criminal offense and resulted ‘proximately,’ or foreseeably, from the criminal offense.”; State failed to establish that damage to light pole was caused by defendant’s intoxicated driving
- indicating that broad interpretations of restitution statutes provide judges greater discretion to rehabilitate criminals, deter future harms, and efficiently compensate victims
- explaining that article 42.037 gives trial courts discretion to order defendant to make restitution and that legislature intended restitution to compensate victim while punishing offender
- concluding that a person who suffers property damage or personal injury as a direct result of a DWI crime may be entitled to restitution even if the offense is a “victimless crime”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
KELLER, P.J.,
filed a dissenting opinion in which KEASLER, J., joined.
While appellant was driving while intoxicated, his car struck a utility pole. The pole was broken in half, with power lines spread on the ground. I believe that those facts, by themselves, are sufficient circumstantial evidence of causation (that the defendant’s crime of driving while intoxicated caused the damage to the utility pole). As we stated in Kuciemba v. State, “Being intoxicated at the scene of a traffic accident in which the actor was a driver is some circumstantial evidence that the actor’s intoxication caused the accident, and the inference of causation is even stronger when the accident is a one-car collision with an inanimate object.” 1 This statement, made in connection with the sufficiency of the evidence to support a DWI conviction, in which the applicable standard of proof at trial was “beyond a reasonable doubt,” should apply with even greater force to the restitution inquiry, which involves the lesser standard of proof of “preponderance of the evidence.” 2 And although appellant claimed that his car struck the utility pole because he ran over a water puddle, the trial judge did not have to credit that self-serving explanation. 3
Further, the force with which appellant hit the utility pole — causing it to break in half — is evidence that appellant failed to timely apply his brakes. The trial judge could rationally infer that such a failure was due to appellant’s intoxication.
I agree with the Court’s analysis of Article 42.087, but I disagree with the way the *100 Court has applied it in this case. I therefore respectfully dissent.
. 310 S.W.3d 460, 462 (Tex.Crim.App.2010). See also Scillitani v. State, 315 S.W.3d 542 (Tex.Crim.App.2010) (vacating and remanding in light of Kuciemba and referring to our statement that "[bjeing intoxicated at the scene of a traffic accident in which the actor was a driver is some circumstantial evidence that the actor's intoxication caused the accident”). The Court contends that the issue in Kuciemba was whether the defendant was intoxicated while driving, not whether his intoxication caused the accident. That is true, but we found that a jury could conclude that the defendant was intoxicated while driving because it could infer that his intoxication caused the accident. Thus, the holding in Kuciemba is directly applicable to this case.
. See Idowu v. State, 73 S.W.3d 918 , 920 n. 5 (Tex.Crim.App.2002) (burden of proof at restitution hearing is preponderance of the evidence).
. See Campbell v. State, 5 S.W.3d 693, 698-99 (Tex.Crim.App.1999) (Though it must take into account the findings of the jury, the trial judge determines the amount of restitution and can assess restitution in an amount that exceeds the property-value range for which the jury convicts the defendant.); Wilson v. State, 311 S.W.3d 452, 458 (Tex.Crim.App.2010) ("As the sole trier of fact during a ... hearing, the trial court may believe or disbelieve all or any part of a witness's testimony.”).