The opinion
Furches, J.,
dissenting. I dissent to that part of the opinion of the Court which adopts the dissenting opinion when the case was here before, and I adopt the opinion- of the Court then filed, as my dissenting opinion to that part- of the opinion filed at this term. Brown v. Morisey, 124 N. C., 292 .
*774 Clark, J.,
dissenting. I concur in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Eurches. There is no scintilla of évidence that the defendant claims under the heirs-at-law of the husband, and what would be the plaintiff’s right to dower as against them or their assignee is not before us. There is no evidence how defendant entered, whether under deed from the husband or without (see statement of facts, 124 N. C., 292 ), but probably under a deed possibly since lost, as the widow living in same county has not stirred till now. All ■that appears is that plaintiff’s husband had a deed to the land in 1855; that he and his wife went to Wilmington in 1856; that in a few days she returned to the county (Duplin) where the land lies, and soon thereafter the defendant took possession, and has been in exclusive possession, cultivating and using it as his own, ever since — over forty years. Nothing else appearing, the defendant’s title is good against the world. The fact that it is further shown that the husband went south and died intestate, prior to 1861, leaving no children, can not affect defendant’s title. The statute, which began running against the husband in his lifetime, was not suspended at his death, even as to minor heirs, and of course not as to' his widow. She can only recover dower by showing that her husband, if living, would be entitled to recover the land in which she claims dower. Otherwise she would be taking dower in defendant’s land, not in her husband’s. If dower had been allotted to plaintiff when disseized, she would be barred in seven or twenty years like anyone else, and she is not entitled (even in that aspect) to longer time under our statute law because she neglected to have dower allotted.