Opinion

Braswell v. . Richmond County

  • 208 N.C. 649
  • 182 S.E. 148
  • 1935 N.C. LEXIS 87
Court
Supreme Court of North Carolina
Filed
Nov 1, 1935
Status
Published
Author
ClaeicsON
On the bench
Connor, Claeicson
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 11.8%

The opinion

ClaeicsON, J.,

dissenting: It may be conceded, as was said in the former opinion of this Court, Braswell v. Richmond County, 206 N. C., 74 , that the statutes in regard to the collection of back taxes are not entirely clear in their meaning, but as to Richmond County there can be no doubt that the sheriff was placed on a commission basis of compensation for the collection of all taxes. Public-Local Laws, Extra Session 1924, chapter 107. No exception was made as to the collection of back taxes. It was specified that this was to be full compensation. While a general statute, N. C. Code, 1935 (Michie), 8009, does provide for payment of certain fees, amounting to 95 cents for each sale of land, this is for necessary expenses, and is not compensation to the sheriff, and has no reference whatever to the question involved in this ease.

The sole basis for granting a rehearing and for reversing the former opinion of this Court, Braswell v. Richmond County, supra, is the following extract from section 8037 of N. C. Code, 1935 (Miehie), which was quoted in the former opinion: “All certificates of sales evidencing purchases by counties shall immediately, upon being allowed as a credit in the settlement with the sheriff of the county, be delivered to the county accountant, county auditor, or other officer, specifically designated by the board of county commissioners, or other governing board of the county, except sheriff or tax collecting officer, and it shall be the duty of the officer, or such officer designated, to collect the same.”

*652 This statute was enacted in 1927, ch. 221, sec. 4, three years after the passage of the statute fixing the compensation of the sheriff of Richmond County, and if there were conflict between them, the later statute would control, but there is no conflict with the statute fixing the compensation of the sheriff. The later statute provides for a check on the office of the sheriff, and requires him to make delivery of certificates of sales evidencing purchases by counties to some properly designated officer. While it is clearly ¡minted out that it is the duty of such officer to collect the taxes due on these certificates of sales evidencing purchases by the counties, it is nowhere said that the actual collection shall not be made by the sheriff or the tax collector.

It would be the natural and logical thing to have the sheriff collect these back taxes, for he already has a force of men equipped to do the job. The county accountant, county auditor, or other officer, specifically designated by the board of county commissioners, must set up a force to do the collecting. Now that can be done, but in Richmond County it would mean that while the sheriff is excused from collecting the back taxes, the county commissioners are not relieved of the legal obligation to compensate him for the collection of these taxes. The statute makes no distinction as to the different kinds of taxes. Of course, the statute has reference to the collection of taxes in Richmond County for Richmond County, and not to the collection of license or other taxes for the State De¡Dartment of Revenue. It is taxes due Richmond County with which we are concerned here.

That it was the plain intention of the Legislature of 1924 to provide that the sheriff should collect a commission on all taxes collected is borne out by other statutes that were then in force. C. S., 8026, provides: “When the county or other municipal corporation becomes the purchaser, under the provisions of this chapter, of any real estate sold for taxes, the sheriff shall issue a certificate of purchase in the name of such corporation substantially in the form provided by the two' preceding sections. Such certificates shall remain in the custody of the sheriff, and at any time the county commissioners may assign such certificates to any person wishing to buy, for the amount expressed on the face of the certificate and interest thereon at the rate per centum which the taxes were drawing at the time of the purchase, or for the total amount of all tax on such real estate. Such assignment may be made by the endorsement of the name of the county by the chairman of the board of county commissioners, and such endorsement shall be made when ordered by the county commissioners.”

O. S., 8038, which was also in force at that time, provides in part as follows: “The owner or occupant of any land sold for taxes, or any person having a lien thereon or any interest or estate therein, may re *653 deem tbe same, at any time witbin one year after tbe date of sneb sale, by paying tbe sheriff, for tbe use of sncb purchaser, bis heirs or assigns, tbe sum mentioned in bis certificate, with interest thereon,” etc.

Tbe general statutes in force at tbe time of tbe passage of tbe compensation commission act for tbe sheriff of Richmond County, make it abundantly clear that it was tbe clear intention of tbe Legislature to provide compensation to him also for tbe collection of back taxes, on a commission basis, and it is a well established principle of statutory construction tbat a special act is never abrogated by general law, unless intention to abrogate is very clear. Hammond v. City of Charlotte, 205 N. C., 469 ; Monteith v. Board of Commissioners, 195 N. C., 71 ; State v. Johnson, 170 N. C., 685 .

Tbis action was carefully considered when tbe opinion was written before. I think it was right then, when rendered by a unanimous opinion of tbis Court, and I think it is right now. Tbe general act quoted in tbe main opinion is not applicable to Richmond County, as tbe Richmond County Act is a special one. In the former opinion it was said, and I repeat (206 N. 0., at p. 77) : “We do not think tbe plaintiff would be entitled to tbe per cent on the tax sale certificates until paid. . . . The statutes are not entirely clear in their meaning, but we think tbe just intent is borne out by the position here taken, and no time limit is fixed in tbe local statute before or after sale as to the ‘full compensation for collecting the taxes.’ There are no officials in tbe State tbat have more responsibility for the peace and good order of a county than the sheriffs and ‘the labourer is worthy of his hire.’ ” It is difficult .to get good men to serve the public if you pauperize them.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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