concluding that under McNeely's totality-of-the- circumstances approach, the loss of life "does not reduce the quantum of evidence the State must present to prove exigent circumstances"
How later courts described this case
- concluding that under McNeely's totality-of-the- circumstances approach, the loss of life "does not reduce the quantum of evidence the State must present to prove exigent circumstances"
- noting that in determining whether exigent circumstances justified a warrantless blood draw, we review the district court’s findings of fact for clear error but review the district court’s “ultimate determination of exigency de novo”
- noting in a CVO case that prior to Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013), Minnesota law permitted law enforcement to rely on Minn. Stat. § 169A.51, subd. 2, to obtain warrantless, nonconsensual blood draws from CVO suspects
- the fact of a fatality in a drunk-driving case does not, by itself, create an exigency sufficient to justify a warrantless blood draw
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
GILDEA, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent and join Justice Page’s dissent in part. I agree with Justice Page that the State did not meet its burden to prove exigency, and I join in sections I and II of Justice Page’s dissent on the exigency issue except to the extent he discusses State v. Bernard, 859 N.W.2d 762 (Minn.2015).
For the reasons set forth in my separate dissent in State v. Lindquist, 869 N.W.2d 868 , 2015 WL 4928147 (Minn. Aug. 19, 2015), I would not apply the good faith exception in this case.