The opinion
*761 Bynum, J.,
dissenting. I concur in the opinion of the court except that part of it, witli its results, which puts a construction upon Art. YII, sec. 7, of the Constitution. I regard that clause, rightly understood, as the most important and beneficial provision in it, and believe that the ultimate solvency of these corporations, depends upon the vigorous enforcement of this salutary provision. To my mind, the construction presents no difficulty whatever, except 'that which grows out of a mistaken idea, that constitutions must be short and sententious, at the sacrifice of perspicuity. The obscurity of this section arises out of the fact, that it contains two propositions and one qualification to them. This enables the verbal critic, in violation of the rules of grammar, to apply the qualification to one proposition only, and regardless of both logic and grammar, exclude its application to the other.
To illustrate: 1 Proposition: “ Sec. 7. No county, city, town, or other municipal corporation, shall contract any debt, pledge its faith or loan its credit.” Qualification: “ Unless by a vote of the majority of the qualified voters therein.”
2 Proposition: “ Nor shall any tax be levied or collected by any officers of the same, except for the necessary expenses thereof.” Qualification: “ Unless by the vote of the majority of the qualified voters therein.” The fallacy consists in not applying the qualification to both propositions. Every writing contains these ellipses or omissions, which are to be supplied by the interpreter. Deeds contain the fewest, laws next, and constitutions, from this attempted brevity, contain the most ellipses. Supplying thus, what is omitted and must, in every written language, be understood, the whole section will read thus: “ No county, city, town, or other municipal corporation, shall contract any debt, pledge its faith or loan its credit, unless by a vote of the majority of the qualified voters therein; nor shall any tax be levied or collected by any officers of the same, except for the necessary expenses thereof, unless by a vote of the majority of the qualified voters therein.” This is *762 tlie natural and grammatical construction, and by it only, can the obvious meaning and purpose of the Constitution, be carried into effect. These corporations, within certain limits and qualifications, are the judges of the expenses necessary for their due administration, and they are invested with power to levy taxes sufficient therefor. They are prohibited from levying taxes for purposes not necessary, and they are prohibited from creating debts for any purpose, without the permission of the voters therein. When they are forbidden to expend money for any other than necessary purposes, and are expressly authorized to levy taxes for such purposes only, why superadd the power to create debts for the same purposes?
1 Objection: This cannot be the true construction, because Art. VIII, sec. 4, declares : “ It shall be the duty of the Legislature to provide for the organization of cities, towns and incorporated villages, and to restrict their power of taxation, assessments, borrowing money, contracting debts and loaning their credit, so as to prevent abuses in assessments and in contracting debts by such municipal corporations.” If corporations were already restricted by sec. 7, Art. VII, why empower the Legislature to impose restrictions ?
1. Ansioer. Sec. 4, Art. VIII, applies to future corporations, and does not affect restrictions already impose^ upon existing corporations. It enables the Legislature to impose further restrictions upon future corporations, if the existing constitutional restrictions are not sufficient to prevent abuses. No other construction can be placed upon this section, without making the constitution stultify itself.
2 Objection. Ab inconvenienti. These corporate governments cannot be administered without creating debts, as for payment of salaries, the police and other employees, the building of court houses, bridges and other necessary improvements, which are done by contract, which must result in a debt.
2. Answer. It may be convenient to contract debts, but it *763 is not necessary to do so. If tbe money is in the treasury to pay salaries, employees and to discharge contracts as they become due, it is absurd to call such matters debts in legal contemplation. Our salaries are paid by the State as they fall due, and all its obligations for necessary expenses are paid when the obligations are contracted, or the service is performed. All the States, the United States, and many of the counties and towns of this State, act upon this cash principle, and find their advantage in it. "Why may not all do so % Every county or town knows the value of the taxable property in it. The necessary expenses are easily computed, and the tax necessary to be levied to raise the required sum. If a miscalculation happens to be made, or unexpected expenses create a deficit, just as the State is authorized to supply a casual deficit, (Art. V, sec. 5. Const.), just so it would be competent for counties and cities, to meet the deficiency by the next year’s assessment. What a State can do, a county or city can do, and what all the States of the Union do, all the counties and cities of this State may do — pay their necessary expenses without creating debts, in the sense and spirit of the Constitution. Every creditor of a county or city is entitled to his pay when the service is performed. Merchants generally make a deduction of from 10 to 20 per cent, on cash purchases. If cities and counties acted upon like principles, a like or greater saving would follow. As it is, nothing is more common than to see their “ scrip ” hawked about at fifty cents on the dollar in some places, to the injury if not ruin of the employees, who are the poor and needy of our population.
Suppose a court house is burnt down or a bridge is washed away, must a vote of the people be taken before a contract can be made for re-building it, or a debt contracted therefor ? That would be a necessary but an unexpected expense, falling under the head of a “casual deficit” to meet, which it would be the duty of the county or city, if the money was not on hand to assess and collect taxes, at the earliest period. Or, if *764 deemed more for the ease of tlie tax payer, to re-build on credit, he may be allowed to make Ms choice by his vote, for which express provision is made.
A distinction has been drawn between the power to borrow money and the power to contract a debt. According to the construction of the court, one is prohibited and the other is allowed, by this clause of the constitution. The distinction is rather attenuated and of but little practical value. It is generally “ robbing Peter to pay Paul.” If you borrow money to pay a debt, both sums bearing the same interest, you are no better or worse off. If you can make a better bargain with cash than credit, it is better to borrow. But I hold that, both to borrow and to create a debt, are prohibited unless the power is conferred by popular vote. Neither is necessary in a well-regulated State, county or city government, and both are the crying sins of the present times, alike threatening universal disaster, moral and pecuniary. It is not a question of convenience, but of power. When the Constitution speaks, we must obey. Here, obedience is wisdom and our gain.
3 Objection: Employees and others making contracts, would be defrauded, as they would not know whether the money was collected and in the treasury, or even whether the obligation was enforceable under this construction of the Constitution.
Answer. This matter would soon regulate itself. If the law required the money to be in the treasury to meet necessary expenses, it would be there. If it was not there, it would soon be found out, and no harm would be done. As it is, scrip is issued, either at a depreciated value, to the loss of the county or city, or it is sold by the creditor at a depreciated rate, to his loss. Generally both parties are losers. It is the duty of every contractor to see that the person or corporation making a debt, has the power conferred on him or it to do so. Here, it is to be observed, the power to create debts is not withholden from corporations by the Constitution, but is expressly conferred sub modo, to-wit, by a vote of the corpo- *765 rators. All act with, their eyes open, and no one is deceived, for all have equal and full means of knowing whether the essential pre-requisite to the creation of a valid debt, to-wit, the sanction of a popular vote, has been complied with. It was expressly so held by this court in Broadnax v. Groom, 64 N. C. Rep., 244 , and strongly intimated in Weinstein v. City of Newbern, 71 N. C. Rep., 535 .
4 Objection. The restriction upon the power to contract debts, was intended to apply so as tó prohibit subscriptions to railroads and the like purposes.
Answer. Such an intention cannot be implied from the language of the Constitution. It is not so declared. Where, then, do we derive our right as Judges, to say the restriction applies to one purpose more than another, when the plain terms of the section apply to every purpose ? I can Avell conceive cases where it would be more necessary to the growth and prosperity of a county or city to build railroads through or to them, than to build a market house or a bridge. Under the term “necessary expenses,” there are many other purposes for which debts may be contracted, as dangerous to the tax payers as the building of railroads. Such a construction only avoids one evil by flying to another. There is only one way of escape, and that is by applying the plain prohibition against the contraction of any debt, for any purpose, except in the way prescribed, to-wit, by popular vote.
According to the construction put upon it by the court, Art. 7, sec. 7, liad as well be struck from the Constitution; as I am of opinion that practically, it is thereby made inoperative. If the counties and cities are the judges of Avhat are their necessary expenses, and they have the power to contract debts without limitation for these purposes, it is difficult to see what the prohibition ‘against contracting debts is to act on, or wherefore “ a vote of the majority of the qualified voters therein ” should br taken. In my opinion, to such an impotent conclusion are we led. But is it right ?
*766 The benefits to be derived and the evils to be avoided by a cash administration of government, are too obvious for further comment. The county of Mecklenburg, for one, wisely and with the most beneficial results, acts upon that system. No sufficient reason can be suggested why the city of Charlotte may not administer the city government upon the same principle. In my opinion the Constitution enjoins it.
Pee Cueiam. Judgment affirmed.