holding that, where a defendant files a ____________________________________________ the trial court erred when it denied his motion for the two other stated reasons Appellant proffered during the motion proceeding. See Commonwealth ex rel. Robinson by Robinson v. Robinson, 478 A.2d 800, 804 (Pa. 1984) (“[i]ssues not raised on appeal . . . [are] waived”). -5- J-S36012-20 pre-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea based upon a claim of innocence, a trial court must make credibility determinations and assess the plausibility of the innocence claim
How later courts described this case
- holding that, where a defendant files a ____________________________________________ the trial court erred when it denied his motion for the two other stated reasons Appellant proffered during the motion proceeding. See Commonwealth ex rel. Robinson by Robinson v. Robinson, 478 A.2d 800, 804 (Pa. 1984) (“[i]ssues not raised on appeal . . . [are] waived”). -5- J-S36012-20 pre-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea based upon a claim of innocence, a trial court must make credibility determinations and assess the plausibility of the innocence claim
- holding “a defendant’s innocence claim must be at least plausible to demonstrate, in and of itself, a fair and just reason for presentenee withdrawal of a plea” and “the proper inquiry on consideration of such a withdrawal motion is whether the accused has made some colorable demonstration, under the circumstances, such that permitting withdrawal of the plea would promote fairness and justice”
- holding that “a bare assertion of innocence is not, in and of itself, a sufficient reason” to require a court to grant a presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea, and explaining that the “innocence claim must be at least plausible to demonstrate … a fair and just reason for presentence withdrawal of a plea.”
- explaining that court should consider plausibility and sincerity of defendant’s assertion of innocence, as well as circumstances surrounding pre-sentence motion to withdraw plea, including motivation and timing of request
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
*707 Justice STEVENS,
concurring.
I join the majority in its entirety.
I write separately to emphasize my disapproval with the Superior Court’s bright-line rule that prohibited, as a matter of law, trial courts from assessing the credibility of an “assertion of innocence” made in the context of a presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea. This per se approach, which was based upon the utterance of “magic words,” undermined the trial court’s role as a finder of fact and removed necessary discretion from the court. I agree with the majority that such an approach was unsatisfactory. Trial courts must be permitted to evaluate the credibility of an accused’s assertion of innocence, including the evidence of guilt, of delay, and of ulterior or illicit motive in ruling upon an accused’s presen-tence motion to withdraw a guilty plea.
Moreover, since the majority is reversing the Superior Court as it relates to the first issue, I agree with the majority that it is not necessary, for disposition of this particular case, to reach the Commonwealth’s second issue, which concerns prejudice to the Commonwealth. However, in order to provide guidance to the courts below, it is clear the Commonwealth demonstrated it would have been substantially prejudiced by the withdrawal of Appellee’s guilty plea.
I specifically disagree with the Superior Court that the evidence of the psychological and emotional harm to the young victim, N.O., was insufficient as a matter of law to demonstrate substantial prejudice to the Commonwealth or that it was largely irrelevant to the inquiry of prejudice. The Superi- or Court’s bright-line rule, which attributed no value to the interests of the victims of crime, is inapposite to public policy in this area of the law and to the value of the criminal justice system generally. Rather, as the trial court properly concluded, evidence of the harmful effect of Appellee’s withdrawal of his plea upon N.O.’s psychological and emotional well-being was relevant to the trial court’s inquiry since it had the tendency to make the Commonwealth’s claim of prejudice more or less probable than it would be without that evidence.
*708 As to whether the Commonwealth adduced substantial evidence of the psychological harm to N.O., I agree with the trial court that it did so in this case. The Commonwealth relied upon videotaped testimony of N.O., which was corroborated by testimony from N.O.’s family and a school principal, to argue the child victim’s psychological and emotional well-being would be compromised if the trial court granted Appellee’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Based on the evidence presented, the trial court concluded N.O. was emotionally vulnerable and opined harm would be caused by denying N.O. closure and threatening to force N.O. to relive the brutal rape she endured by testifying at trial. I find no error in the trial court’s conclusion of substantial prejudice in this regard.
Justice BAER joins this concurring opinion.