The opinion
*442 Douglas, J.,
concurring in result. Tbe opinion of tbe Court says: “When tbe facts are known and only one inference can be drawn from tbem, negligence is a question of law for tbe Court.” I know there are precedents tending in that direction, but it seems to me, on tbe better and greater weight of authority, that tbe rule is too broadly stated even if instrinsically correct.
Under tbe rule of “tbe prudent man” — which seems now to be meeting with practically universal acceptance — negligence, and especially in its proximate relation to tbe injury, is a mixed question of law and fact for tbe determination of tbe jury. Tbe Court can, in proper cases, direct tbe plaintiff to be nonsuited on tbe ground that there is no evidence tending to prove negligence, but any intimation that tbe Court can weigh tbe evidence and harmonize conflicting inferences, and then say that negligence has or has not been proved, either on tbe part of tbe plaintiff or tbe defendant, is a proposition too dangerous in its tendencies to admit of my approval.