Later courts went against this
Overruled by State Ex Rel. Quinn v. Lattimore, 120 N.C. 426 (1897)
110 N. C., 232, is overruled, and the more liberal construction placed upon the Statute in the dissenting opinion, is approved.
The opinion
Clark, J.
concurring in result, but dissenting in part from the reasoning: It is within the power of the Legislature to adopt reasonable regulations in regard to the registration of voters. The act in question is not obnoxious to any charge of interference with the constitutional right of voting. The requirement that the party offering himself for registration shall give his place of birth, his place of residence and the township from which he has removed, is reasonable, as it aids the purpose of tracing out and preventing attempted frauds on the elective franchise.
When the voters in Little River Township and precinct, to the interrogatories of the registrar, gave simply “Montgomery County ” as their place of birth and residence, such answer, if truthful, and in the absence of a requirement in the statute *243 that the voter should particularize further by giving the name of the town or township of birth and residence was sufficient, and it was error to hold that the votes of persons so registered should be thrown out. Most especially is this so, when the officer of the law received such responses without objection or demand for further particularity or identification on the part of the voter.
As to the voters at Bean’s Mill precinct, Ophir Township, the response of “ Montgomery County,” as place of residence, was, as we have said, sufficient, especially when no further information was sought by the registrar. The response of “ Ophir ” to the question as to the township whence the voter had removed was sufficiently definite, and could only be understood as meaning that the voter was still, as he had been at the previous election, a resident of that township. The response giving “ North Carolina ” as the place of birth is indefinite. But it was error in the Court to hold, as a matter of law, th&tper se this was the fault of the voter and invalidated the vote given by him. Whether it was so or not, depended upon the facts of the case. If the registrar, when such response was given, had asked for a fuller and more definite response, and this had been refused or not given, then there would have been conduct on the part of the person offering to register which might be justly held as sufficient to deprive him of the right to vote. But the registi'ar is the officer of the law.. He is appointed to make the inquiries and set down the replies. When, in response to the inquiry as to the place of birth, the elector in good faith, and thinking he had complied with all that was required of him, responded “ North Carolina,” he was guilty of no disobedience of law or other act which deprived him of his right to vote. If the response was not sufficiently definite, the representative of the law, the registrar duly appointed, sworn and paid to perform the duty of taking the registration, should have asked the elector to respond more particularly, *244 and if the registrar failed to do so, the neglect of duly was on the part of the registrar. The elector might well be justified in taking the acquiescence of the officer as a representation that the answer was a full compliance with the requirements of the law. Any other view, it would seem, would make the registration of voters not an impartial observance of regulations to protect the electoral franchise and to prevent frauds upon it, but would furnish opportunities whereby the trusting, the unwary, the unskilled or the ignorant would be deprived of their constitutional right of exercising the right of voting. This presupposes that the answers of the party offering to register were made in good faith, and this is a presumption of law, as the burden of invalidating such vote is upon the plaintiff who is seeking to reverse the result of the vote as cast. Of course if the voter is shown to have answered evasively and indefinitely purposely, in bad faith, or if asked for further information refuses it, or if informed that his reply is insufficient, he failed to make it more definite, the fault would be his and his intentional non-compliance with the reasonable requirements of the statute would invalidate his vote.
As to voters from Troy Township, in regard to whom it appeared that the inquiry required by law was addressed, which they'failed or refused to answer, such votes were properly held invalid.
Davis, J., concurred in the opinion of Clark, J.
Per curiam. Error.