The opinion
AlleN, J.,
dissenting: I concur in the general principles stated in the opinion of the Court, but I think they have no application to the statute before us.
The General Assembly at first provided for elections to be held in school districts, upon petition, to ascertain if the voters would consent to the levy of a special tax for school purposes. The object of the statute was to stimulate interest in education and to afford an opportunity to those who desired better school facilities to obtain them; but it was soon found that many were unwilling to vote for the tax if they could not get rid of it, if they became dissatisfied or reached the conclusion that it was no longer necessary, and the original act was amended in 1909 and 1911 by adding thereto the following:
“Upon petition of two-thirds of the qualified voters residing in any special tax district established under this section, endorsed and approved by the county board of education, the board of county commissioners shall order another election in said district for submitting the question of revoking said tax and abolishing said district, to be held under the provisions prescribed in this section for holding other elections: Provided, that no election for revoking a special tax in any special tas district shall be ordered and held in said district within less than two years from the date of the election at which the tax was voted and the district established, nor at any time within less than two years after the date of the last election on said question in said district; and no petition revoking such tax shall be approved by the county board of education oftener than once in two years.”
The dominant and controlling purpose of the act as'amended is that the people of a school district may by popular vote determine for themselves the wisdom and expediency of levying, in the first instance, and of discontinuing the tax, and I cannot think it was the intention of the General Assembly to invest the board of education, a nonelective body, with authority, as a supervising guardian, to thwart this purpose.
The people have the right to a vote — the statute says so — but, under the construction placed on the statute by the Court, the board of educa *128 tion may, without giving any reason for its action, say to them, “You shall not vote,” although the requirements of the statute have been complied with.
Why give the right to hold an election if this is what was meant by the Legislature? It would have been simpler and less misleading to have provided that the tax should be discontinued when so ordered by the board of education.
What, then, is the meaning of the language “endorsed and approved by the county board of education”? The county board has charge of the schools of the county, and knows the boundaries and patrons of the districts better than any other official body. It also knows when and where elections have been held. It was necessary that some one should examine and scrutinize the petition to see if in fact two-thirds of the voters of the district had signed it, and also to ascertain if a school election had been held within two years.
These duties are imposed by the statute on the board of education, and when they have been performed, they can, in my opinion, be compelled to endorse and approve, and thereby make effective the real purpose of the statute, and not defeat it.
Did the General Assembly intend to say to the people, “Vote for a special tax for schools, and after you have tried it two years if you are dissatisfied or think the tax no longer necessary you may hold another election on the question if you satisfy the board of education that two-thirds of the voters desire it,” or, “Vote for the tax, and after you have tried it two years you may hold another election if the board of education will permit the election to be held” ?
I think the first construction the better.
BeowN, J., concurs in dissenting opinion.