Opinion

Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens

  • 25 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 15
  • 83 U.S.L.W. 4029
  • 135 S. Ct. 547
  • 190 L. Ed. 2d 495
  • 2014 U.S. LEXIS 8435
Court
Supreme Court of the United States
Filed
Dec 15, 2014
Status
Published
Author
Thomas
On the bench
Ginsburgdelivered, Thomas
Cited by
733 cases
Authority
More cited than 11.6%

holding in a Class Action Fairness Act case removal that the district court may permit post-removal discovery and make jurisdictional findings under the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard the amount in controversy is in dispute when after removal

How later courts described this case

  • holding in a Class Action Fairness Act case removal that the district court may permit post-removal discovery and make jurisdictional findings under the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard the amount in controversy is in dispute when after removal
  • recognizing that, should the Supreme Court refuse to review a district court order, which the court of appeals denied leave to appeal, the district court’s incorrect statement 70 of the law would remain impermissibly “frozen in place”
  • granting certiorari on the question "[w]hether a defendant seeking removal to federal court is required to include evidence supporting federal jurisdiction in the notice of removal" and concluding that evidence is required, at least as to the amount-in-controversy requirement, "only when the plaintiff contests, or the court questions, the defendant's allegation" in the notice of removal
  • noting that after the amount in 16 controversy has been challenged, the parties may submit affidavits, declarations, or other 17 summary-judgment-type evidence to the court

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

Justice THOMAS, dissenting.

I agree with Justice SCALIA that the merits of the District Court's decision are not properly before the Court. I write only to point out another, more fundamental, defect in the Court's disposition: We lack jurisdiction to review even the Court of Appeals' denial of permission to appeal.

Congress has granted this Court jurisdiction to review "[c]ases in the courts of appeals" by writ of certiorari. 28 U.S.C. § 1254 . Purporting to act pursuant to this grant of jurisdiction, the majority today reviews the decision of the Court of Appeals to deny an application for permission to appeal a remand order. But such an application is not a case: It " 'does not assert a grievance against anyone, does not seek remedy or redress for any legal injury, and does not even require a "party" on the other side.' " Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 , 355, 123 S.Ct. 1029 , 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003)(THOMAS, J., dissenting) (quoting Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236 , 256, 118 S.Ct. 1969 , 141 L.Ed.2d 242 (1998)(SCALIA, J., dissenting)).

To justify its action here, the majority quietly extends an opinion of this Court holding that applications for certificates of appealability (COAs) in the federal habeas context are "cases." Hohn, supra . Hohn was wrongly decided, and the majority's uncritical extension of its holding only compounds the error. Hohn rests tenuously on the conclusion that the determination that must be made on an application for a COA is more like a threshold determination than a separate judicial proceeding. See id., at 246-248 , 118 S.Ct. 1969 . The basis for that conclusion, if any exists, must rest on features unique to the COA: "The COA determination ... requires an overview of the claims in the habeas petition and a general assessment of their merits." Miller-El, supra, at 336 , 123 S.Ct. 1029 (emphasis added). The best argument one could make in favor of Hohn is that, because a court's decision on an application for a COA turns on the strength of the applicant's grievance and his entitlement to relief, the application absorbs the case-like qualities of the underlying merits case. See Hohn, supra, at 248 , 118 S.Ct. 1969 .

No such osmosis could transform an application for permission to appeal a remand order into a "case." As Justice SCALIA explains, the decision whether to permit such an appeal requires no assessment of the merits of a remand order. See ante, at 558 - 559 (dissenting opinion). The application here is nothing more than a request for discretionary permission to seek review. See Miller-El, supra, at 355 , 123 S.Ct. 1029 (THOMAS, J., dissenting). The Tenth Circuit having denied that permission, no "case" ever arrived "in the court of appeals." I would dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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