explaining that “‘particularly’ means ‘especially’ or ‘specifically’” and that “requiring a defendant to be particularly amenable to probation . . . ensure[s] that the defendant’s amenability to probation distinguishes the defendant from most others and truly presents the substantial and compelling circumstances that are necessary to justify a departure” (quotation omitted)
How later courts described this case
- explaining that “‘particularly’ means ‘especially’ or ‘specifically’” and that “requiring a defendant to be particularly amenable to probation . . . ensure[s] that the defendant’s amenability to probation distinguishes the defendant from most others and truly presents the substantial and compelling circumstances that are necessary to justify a departure” (quotation omitted)
- holding that a sentencing court must assign a sentence within the presumptive range “‘unless there exist identifiable, substantial, and compelling circumstances’ that distinguish a case”
- holding that particular amenability to probation, rather than mere amenability to probation, “can justify staying a presumptively executed sentence,” which is a dispositional departure
- noting that “[a] sentencing court ‘must pronounce a sentence within the applicable range unless there exist identifiable, substantial, and compelling circumstances’” justifying a departure from the presumptive range (quoting Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.D.1)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
ANDERSON, Justice
(dissenting).
I join in the dissent of Justice Page.