noting that the trial judge’s findings of fact are given the same weight as the verdict of a jury
How later courts described this case
- noting that the trial judge’s findings of fact are given the same weight as the verdict of a jury
- noting that we are bound by the trial court’s factual findings
- vacating entry of judgment
- “[W]hen the language of a contract is clear and unequivocal, courts interpret its meaning by its content alone, within the four corners of the document.” (citation omitted)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
DISSENTING OPINION BY
MUSMANNO, J.:
Because the record supports the trial court’s credibility determinations and factual findings, I dissent.
Thorsten Stephan (“Stephan”) filed the instant action against Waldron Electric Heating and Cooling, LLC (“Waldron”), alleging “extreme overcharging by [Wal-dron] for a minor home repair.” Com *670 plaint, 5/21/12, at 1. The magistrate, a panel of arbitrators, and the trial court sitting as fact-finder all agreed with Stephan and found in his favor. The trial court, in fact, specifically found Stephan to be credible, and Waldron to be not credible. Trial Court Memorandum, 11/19/13, at 1 (unnumbered).
In its Opinion, the Majority rejects the trial court’s determination, observing that “the trial court did not cite trial testimony, exhibits or any specific basis for its credibility determinations.” Majority Opinion at 667. However, as this Court has recognized, “[credibility determinations and consideration of conflicts in the evidence are within the purview of the trial court and such evidence should not be reweighed on appeal.” John B. Conomos, Inc. v. Sun Co., 831 A.2d 696, 703 (Pa.Super.2003). “We do not disturb findings of fact simply because this Court would have reached a different conclusion, but rather determine whether there is competent evidence in the record that a judicial mind could reasonably have determined to support the finding.” Id.
The competent evidence of record reflects that, for the 15-minute replacement of a burnt wire in an electrical outlet, Waldron charged Stephan $402 for the diagnosis, $721 for the repair, and an administrative fee of $251. The trial court credited Stephan’s testimony, and found that “[Waldron’s] conduct was deceptive, unreasonable, and unjust.” Trial Court Memorandum, 11/19/13, at 1 (unnumbered). Because Stephan’s testimony supports the trial court’s finding, and the amount charged for a 15-minute repair is outrageous, I would affirm the judgment entered by the trial court.