Opinion

Blunt v. Lower Merion School District

  • 767 F.3d 247
  • 2014 WL 4474002
Court
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Filed
Sep 12, 2014
Status
Published
Author
Ambro
On the bench
McKee, Ambro, Greenberg
Cited by
854 cases
Authority
More cited than 11.5%

stating that the relevant factors in determining whether the causes of action in two cases are sufficiently alike include: “(1) whether the acts complained of and the demand for relief are the same . . .; (2) whether the theory of recovery is the same; (3) whether the witnesses and documents at trial are the same . . .; and (4) whether the material facts alleged are the same. It is not dispositive that a plaintiff asserts a different theory of recovery or seeks different relief in the two actions” (internal quotation and citation omitted)

How later courts described this case

  • stating that the relevant factors in determining whether the causes of action in two cases are sufficiently alike include: “(1) whether the acts complained of and the demand for relief are the same . . .; (2) whether the theory of recovery is the same; (3) whether the witnesses and documents at trial are the same . . .; and (4) whether the material facts alleged are the same. It is not dispositive that a plaintiff asserts a different theory of recovery or seeks different relief in the two actions” (internal quotation and citation omitted)
  • finding no associational standing where “individual student plaintiffs are seeking monetary reimbursement” such that “organizational representation of th[em would be] insufficient without their personal par ticipation in this litigation”
  • concluding that an organization lacked standing to sue on behalf of its members because of the “highly individualized nature” of the claims
  • holding that the Title IX deliberate indiffer- ence standard is applicable to Title VI claims

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

AMBRO, Circuit Judge,

concurring.

I agree with and join in Judge Green-berg’s excellent and thorough opinion as to all but Part VIL B, which deals with whether Appellant Concerned Black Parents of Mainline Inc. (“CBP”) has standing to sue. Although standing is a jurisdictional requirement that cannot be waived, Pub. Interest Research Grp. of N.J., Inc. v. Magensium Elektron, Inc., 123 F.3d 111 , 117 n. 5 (3d Cir.1997), “the presence of one plaintiff with standing is sufficient to satisfy that requirement.” Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219 , 228 n. 7 (3d Cir.2004) (citing *304 Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 721 , 106 S.Ct. 3181 , 92 L.Ed.2d 583 (1986)), rev’d on other grounds, 547 U.S. 47 , 126 S.Ct. 1297 , 164 L.Ed.2d 156 (2006). The standing of the individual Plaintiffs here has never been challenged (nor should it). Thus the individual Plaintiffs confer standing and CBP’s standing as an organization is irrelevant.

Were it necessary to decide, I would agree with Judge McKee that, under Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 , 102 S.Ct. 1114 , 71 L.Ed.2d 214 (1982), CBP has standing to sue on its own behalf. However, I also agree with Judge Green-berg that the claims of the individual Plaintiffs were properly dismissed at summary judgment. CBP, who shared counsel with some of the individual Plaintiffs, has not explained how, were it permitted to continue as a plaintiff in the case, it could prevail where the individual Plaintiffs have failed. Thus I agree with Judge Green-berg’s disposition of these appeals on their merits. For these reasons, I concur.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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