Opinion

Lang v. Director, Ohio Department of Job & Family Services

  • 196 Ohio App. 3d 80
  • 962 N.E.2d 357
  • 2011 Ohio 4327
Court
Ohio Court of Appeals
Filed
Aug 29, 2011
Status
Published
Author
Rogers
On the bench
Shaw, Rogers
Cited by
1 cases

The opinion

Rogers, Presiding Judge,

dissenting.

{¶ 37} Although I understand the logic of the well-reasoned opinion of the majority, I interpret the statute differently and must therefore dissent.

{¶ 38} The statute at issue defines who may elect to receive benefits. Section 2318(a)(3)(B), Title 19, U.S.Code. This definition contains six qualifications for recipients, numbered i thru vi. Number i is a general certification requirement; number ii is the requirement that the individual “obtain reemployment not more than 26 weeks after the date of separation from the adversely affected employment”; number iii, the term at issue here, requires that the individual be “at least *93 50 years of age”; number iv requires that the individual earn “not more than $50,000 a year in wages from reemployment”; number v requires that the individual be “employed on a full-time basis”; and number vi requires that the individual “not return to the employment from which the worker was separated.”

{¶ 39} Reading the section as a whole, I find it obvious that requirements ii and iv thru vi must be determined at the time the individual obtains reemployment. The following issues must be addressed:

(ii) have 26 weeks passed since separation?;

(iv) is the worker to receive a pay rate of $50,000 or less per year?;

(v) is the reemployment a.full time position?; and

(vi) the worker is prohibited from returning to the prior employment.

{¶ 40} Consistency in interpretation then compels me to determine requirement number iii at the time of reemployment as well.

{¶ 41} Therefore, I read the statute as requiring the worker to be 50 years of age at the time of reemployment, consistent with the determination of ODJFS, and TEGL No. 2-03. If my interpretation is correct, the decision of the trial court must be reversed. Furthermore, if my interpretation is not correct, then I would argue that the statute is ambiguous because it is subject to more than one rational interpretation, that TEGL No. 2-03 then applies, and the decision of the trial court must still be reversed. Accordingly, I must dissent from the opinion of the majority.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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