finding that “the imposition of consecutive sentences in this case is contrary to law” when the court failed to make the required findings at the sentencing hearing and in the journal entry. “Thus, we are constrained to reverse the judgment of the appellate court, vacate the sentence, and remand the matter to the trial court for resentencing.”
How later courts described this case
- finding that “the imposition of consecutive sentences in this case is contrary to law” when the court failed to make the required findings at the sentencing hearing and in the journal entry. “Thus, we are constrained to reverse the judgment of the appellate court, vacate the sentence, and remand the matter to the trial court for resentencing.”
- holding that, “as long as the reviewing court can discern that the trial court engaged in the correct analysis and can determine that the record contains evidence to support findings, consecutive sentences should be upheld.”
- stating that a sentencing court is not "required to give a talismanic incantation of the words of the statute, provided that the necessary findings can be found in the record and are incorporated into the sentencing entry"
- instructing that "as long as the reviewing court can discern that the trial court engaged in the correct analysis and can determine that the record No. 15AP-1076 4 contains evidence to support the findings, consecutive sentences should be upheld"
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
French, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
{¶ 38} I join the majority’s opinion, except in its conclusion that a sentencing court must always recite its findings at the sentencing hearing and then again in the sentencing entry. In my view, a sentencing court can satisfy R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) by making the findings in the sentencing entry, or at the sentencing hearing, or through a combination of both, so long as the record clearly and convincingly shows that it has done so. No statute requires the sentencing court to make the findings at the sentencing hearing and then again in its sentencing entry. Instead, an appellate court may reverse a sentence for failure to make the R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) findings if the “record, including the findings underlying the sentence,” R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), clearly and convincingly shows that the sentence was “contrary to law,” R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b). While a court enters judgment only through its journal entries, it can make sentencing findings elsewhere. Since the General Assembly has given sentencing courts flexibility as to where they must “note that [they] engaged in the analysis” required by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), see State v. Edmonson, 86 Ohio St.3d 324, 326 , 715 N.E.2d 131 (1999), I see no basis for inserting a sentencing-hearing or sentencing-entry requirement where the General Assembly has not.
Kennedy, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion.