Opinion

Jacqueline Halbig v. Sylvia Mathews Burwell

  • 758 F.3d 390
  • 411 U.S. App. D.C. 199
  • 114 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5225
  • 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 13880
  • 2014 WL 3579745
Court
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
Filed
Jul 22, 2014
Status
Published
Author
Randolph
On the bench
Edwards, Griffith, Randolph
Cited by
15 cases
Authority
More cited than 11.4%

having found sec. 36B unambiguous, concluding that weight of legislative history, including overall congressional policy goals, did not override statute’s plain meaning, which was that tax credits were unavailable to participants in health insurance exchanges established by the Federal Government

How later courts described this case

  • having found sec. 36B unambiguous, concluding that weight of legislative history, including overall congressional policy goals, did not override statute’s plain meaning, which was that tax credits were unavailable to participants in health insurance exchanges established by the Federal Government
  • “Accordingly, applying the statute’s plain meaning, we find that section 36B unambiguously forecloses the interpretation embodied in the IRS Rule and instead limits the availability of premium tax credits to state-established Exchanges.”
  • "Here, the scant legislative history sheds little light on the precise question of the availability of subsidies on federal Exchanges.”
  • acknowledging that the Secretary establishes Federal Exchanges under Section 18031

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge,

concurring:

A Supreme Court tax decision, and a tax decision of this court, flatly reject the position the government takes in this case.

As Judge Griffith’s majority opinion— which I fully join — demonstrates, an Exchange established by the federal government cannot possibly be “an Exchange established by the State.” To hold otherwise would be to engage in distortion, not interpretation. Only further legislation could accomplish the expansion the government seeks.

In the meantime, Justice Brandéis’ opinion for the Supreme Court in Iselin v. United States is controlling: “What the government asks is not a construction of a statute, but, in effect, an enlargement of it by the court, so that what was omitted, presumably by inadvertence, may be included within its scope. To supply omissions transcends the judicial function.” 270 U.S. 245, 251 , 46 S.Ct. 248 , 70 L.Ed. 566 (1926). We held the same in National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. United States, 431 F.3d 374, 378 (D.C.Cir.2005), citing not only Iselin but also Lamie v. United States Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 538 , 124 S.Ct. 1023 , 157 L.Ed.2d 1024 (2004), which reaffirmed Iselin’s “longstanding” interpretative principle.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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