holding that “the traditional four-factor test employed by courts of equity, including the requirement that the plaintiff must establish irreparable injury in seeking a permanent injunction” applies not only in the patent and copyright context, but “the same principle applies to trademark infringement under the Lanham Act.”
How later courts described this case
- holding that “the traditional four-factor test employed by courts of equity, including the requirement that the plaintiff must establish irreparable injury in seeking a permanent injunction” applies not only in the patent and copyright context, but “the same principle applies to trademark infringement under the Lanham Act.”
- holding that, for a preliminary injunction, plaintiff must establish that monetary damages are inadequate to compensate for the injury
- holding that a plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction in a trademark infringement case must establish a likelihood of irreparable harm that is grounded in evidence, not in conclusory or speculative allegations of harm
- stating the Court “permissibly relied on the 19 declaration” of one of the parties’ general managers in considering a motion for a 20 preliminary injunction in a trademark case, though reversing and remanding because “the 21 record fails to support a finding of likely irreparable harm”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
WALLACE, Senior Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I agree that the district court’s preliminary injunction should be reversed. However, I write separately to emphasize that we are solely reviewing a preliminary injunction, and that we thus can express no view on issues arising after a trial dealing with a permanent injunction. See, e.g., Barahona-Gomez v. Reno, 167 F.3d 1228, 1234-35, 1238 (9th Cir.1999) (stating that the court, in reviewing a preliminary injunction, “express[ed] no opinion on the ultimate merits of [the] action”).