holding “that the importance of the Sixth Amendment compels us to consider all claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel raised in a timely application for post-conviction relief’
How later courts described this case
- holding “that the importance of the Sixth Amendment compels us to consider all claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel raised in a timely application for post-conviction relief’
- holding capital petitioner's competency claim procedurally barred because he failed to raise the issue on direct appeal
- “[W]e find that the importance of the Sixth Amendment compels us to consider all claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel raised in a timely application for post-conviction relief and no longer apply a procedural bar when appellate counsel and trial counsel were the same.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
C. JOHNSON, JUDGE,
specially concurring.
¶ 1 I specially concur in the well-reasoned decision by the Court. I personally have a problem with the application of procedural bar, and the use of such terms as “procedural bar,” “bar” and “waiver,” which strictly prohibit consideration of legal issues raised on appeal. I am troubled by the use of these procedural rules which keep this Court from reviewing potentially meritorious claims involving factual innocence, and ineffective assistance of counsel when counsel at trial and on appeal are the same or counsel on appeal and post-conviction counsel are the same.
¶ 2 I recognize that a criminal defendant is entitled to a fair trial — not a perfect trial. Lahey v. State, 1987 OK CR 188, ¶ 29 , 742 P.2d 581, 585 . A fair trial requires effective assistance of counsel. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 696 , 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2069 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)(“In every case the court should be concerned with whether, despite the strong presumption of reliability, the result of the particular proceeding is unreliable because of a breakdown in the adversarial process that our system counts on to produce just results.”) This Court has a responsibility under the separation of powers doctrine to review ineffective assistance of counsel claims or other matters raised on appeal, even where the legislature seemingly has precluded review of those claims by legislating what power this Court may exercise.