addressing constitutional challenge to amended § 2403 and noting that its constitutionality does not depend upon the political motives of the legislators who voted for it
How later courts described this case
- addressing constitutional challenge to amended § 2403 and noting that its constitutionality does not depend upon the political motives of the legislators who voted for it
- "'The amount of deference given to counsel's strategic decisions depends on the amount of investigation that went into them"
- "One important purpose of mitigation evidence is to humanize the defendant in the eyes of the jury."
- "[Clounsel's brief, eleventh-hour discussion with Appellant's parents and sister about testifying in the punishment stage ... surely does not begin to approach a true mitigation investigation."
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Chapel, JUDGE,
concur in results:
T1 I concur in affirming the conviction in this case, and I concur in modifying the sentence to life without parole. In fact, with the exception of Proposition III, I otherwise agree with the analysis of and would join the majority's well-reasoned and thoughtful Opinion. I cannot, however, agree with the Opinion's analysis of Proposition III. The Appellant's defense at trial was that he acted in a heat of passion and without malice aforethought in killing his wife. Under these cireumstances I believe that the trial court should instruct on the heat-of-passion defense and upon the State's burden to disprove it, where the defense is raised as an affirmative defense and adequately raised by the evidence. See my dissent in Hogan v. State, 2006 OK CR 19 , 139 P.3d 907, 937-44 . However, under the facts of the current case, I find that the evidence is sufficient to support Appellant's first-degree murder conviction and that his conviction is rightly affirmed.
LEWIS, Judge, concurs in part/dissents in part.
{ 1 I concur with the majority opinion insofar as affirming the conviction. I dissent to the modification to life without parole.
T2 I am of the opinion that the appropriate remedy for an improper sentencing is to remand the case back to the trial court. Then a properly instructed jury, hearing all properly admissible evidence, could decide the appropriate punishment for Appellant. I agree that the mitigation strategy in this case was deficient, however, I dissent to taking the issue of punishment away from the jury.