holding that the test for whether such expressions of opinion are statements of fact is SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA I947A 7 "whether a reasonable person would be likely to understand the remark as an expression of the source's opinion or as a statement of existing fact"
How later courts described this case
- holding that the test for whether such expressions of opinion are statements of fact is SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA I947A 7 "whether a reasonable person would be likely to understand the remark as an expression of the source's opinion or as a statement of existing fact"
- holding that the fair report privilege extends "to all public, official actions or proceedings" and is not limited to judicial proceedings
- reversing a jury verdict finding actual malice because the jury instructions omitted "serious" before "doubt," leading the jury to apply a lower standard
- explaining the actual malice standard is 3 “required by the U.S. Constitution when the subject of the alleged defamation is a public 4 figure”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Becker, J.,
concurring:
I agree that the district court improperly instructed the jury on the issue of malice, using the standard set forth in New York Times 1 rather than the standard required by our holdings in Posadas and Allen 2 I write separately to indicate my disagreement with the “serious doubt” standard for invéstigation created by these cases. In my opinion, the standard imposed by the United States Supreme Court in New York Times is the better rule of law.
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
Posadas v. City of Reno, 109 Nev. 448 , 851 P.2d 438 (1993); Nevada Independent Boadcasting v. Allen, 99 Nev. 404 , 664 P.2d 337 (1983).