noting that the right to a jury determination of whether a prior conviction occurred exists only “in an appropriate case,” and that “depending on the circumstances, the question might well be for the court” rather than the jury
How later courts described this case
- noting that the right to a jury determination of whether a prior conviction occurred exists only “in an appropriate case,” and that “depending on the circumstances, the question might well be for the court” rather than the jury
- positing grounds on which the fact of a prior conviction may be challenged, including mistaken identity and fabricated, insufficient, inaccurate, or inauthentic records
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
KENNARD, J.
I dissent.
The majority holds that the Legislature has not, by the 1997 amendment to Penal Code section 1025, eliminated a criminal defendant’s long-established statutory right to jury trial on a prior conviction allegation, but it also holds that the complete denial of that jury trial right may be, and here was, harmless error.
I disagree that denial of an accused’s right to jury trial—whether the right’s source is statutory or constitutional—may ever be harmless. As I explained in my dissenting opinion in People v. Vera (1997) 15 Cal.4th 269, 282-286 [ 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 754 , 934 P.2d 1279 ] (dis. opn. of Kennard, J.), “[t]he denial of jury trial is a structural error that can never be harmless, no matter how strong the evidence of guilt.” (Id. at p. 286; see also People v. Kelii (1999) 21 Cal.4th 452, 463 [ 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 674 , 981 P.2d 518 ] (dis. opn. of Kennard, J.).) Because the Court of Appeal here correctly so held, I would affirm the Court of Appeal’s judgment.
Appellant’s petition for a rehearing was denied May 16, 2001. Mosk, J., and Kennard, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.