denial of motion to trifureate proceedings was not error in light of limiting instructions
How later courts described this case
- denial of motion to trifureate proceedings was not error in light of limiting instructions
- denial of motion to trifurcate proceedings was not error in light of limiting instructions
- “The evidence in the present case does not support the conclusion that [Williams] acted without any premeditated design to effect death.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
CHAPEL, Judge,
Dissenting:
T1 Williams requested Second Degree Murder instructions at trial 1 As the trial court's denial of Williams's request and refusal to so instruct the jury constituted reversible error, his Judgment and Sentence should be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.
T2 In Hogan v. Gibson, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals was critical of applying a "sufficiency of the evidence for the greater offense" standard to assess the necessity of lesser-included instructions. 2 Mindful of Ho *734 gan, the majority opinion correctly states that lesser-included instructions such as those sought by Williams should be given if supported by the evidence 3 As well, the majority accurately cites the applicable test as "whether the evidence might allow a jury to acquit the defendant of the greater offense and convict him of the lesser." 4
13 Notwithstanding the lip service paid to the Tenth Circuit, this case is Hogan redux. Its conclusions were correctly noted but erroneously applied 5 The majority opinion states but ignores the proper test, replacing it with a rule that essentially excuses a refusal to give warranted instructions whenever the evidence supports the jury's ultimate determination. 6 While I agree that the evidence presented at Williams's trial may have sufficiently supported a finding that he intended to kill the victim and was guilty of First Degree Murder, that determination is irrelevant to whether he was entitled to a lesser-included offense instruction.
T4 The majority's analysis turns on its claim that the evidence does not support the conclusion that Williams acted without premeditated intent. 7 It reiterates indications of Williams's intent to kill the victim, 8 dismisses one of Williams's arguments by noting that premeditation can be formed in an instant, 9 and concludes that since the evidence was sufficient for any rational trier of fact to find that Williams acted with the intent to kill, Second Degree Murder instructions were not warranted. 10 This analysis is a backhanded way of stating that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's finding of intent to kill, and remains a "gross deviation" from the Beck rule as noted by the Hogan Court. 11
15 I find that Williams was entitled to a Second Degree Murder instruction. Specifically, Second Degree "Depraved Mind" Murder occurs when death results from an act imminently dangerous to another, done with a depraved mind but without a premeditated design to effect death. 12 Williams's act of stabbing the victim's chest was imminently dangerous and evidenced reckless indifference to her life and safety. The central question here is whether he committed this act with or without the intent to kill. The evidence supports either conclusion.
16 Williams entered the victim's house with her consent, purportedly to deliver meat. Indeed, his possession of a steak box containing a knife, gloves, and duct tape suggests an entry was prompted by criminal intent-Rape, Kidnapping or Murder. 13 The prosecution's theory was that he planned to rape the victim. The evidence indicates that during Williams's struggle to subdue the vie-tim, he fatally stabbed her once in the chest. Did he intend to kill her? Perhaps. By contrast, his single stab could have been a defensive reaction to her struggle, intended to subdue her further, prevent his own injury, or facilitate his flight from the scene. The record indicates that the evidence supports either characterization, which is exactly why a lesser-included instruction should have *735 been given. 14 The question (and the answer) was one for the jury. Just as a reasonable juror could have found the elements for First Degree Murder, so could a juror have determined that Williams did not intend to kill the victim, convicting him of Second Degree Murder instead. 15
17 Williams should have received his requested instruction; failure to give it was reversible error. I dissent.
. Second Degree Murder is divided into two sub-parts: murder committed (1) by one with a "depraved mind" or (2) during the commission of a felony other than those enumerated in the First Degree Murder statute. 21 O0.S.1991, § 701.8 Although Williams's request for Second Degree Murder instructions rested on both theories, only the "depraved mind" claim has merit. Similarly, the denial of Williams's request for First Degree Manslaughter instructions was appropriate as those instructions were not supported by the evidence.
. Hogan v. Gibson, 197 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir.1999). The Tenth Circuit elaborated: "[the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals should con *734 sider] whether there is sufficient evidence to warrant instructing the jury on a lesser included offense, not whether there is sufficient evidence to warrant conviction of the greater offense." Id. at 1305 .
. Majority Opinion at 711 citing Shrum v. State, 991 P.2d 1032, 1037-39 (Okl.Cr.1999).
. Majority Opinion at 711 citing Hogan v. Gibson, 197 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir.1999).
. This is not the first time this Court has erroneously analyzed a lesser included instruction question. See Gilson v. State, 8 P.3d 883, 932 (Okl.Cr.2000) (Chapel, J., dissenting).
. "The evidence clearly supports a finding that when Appellant stabbed the deceased, he did so with the intent to kill her, regardless of whether that intent was formed prior to or after arriving at her home. Accordingly, instructions on second degree depraved mind murder were not warranted." Majority Opinion ai 712.
. Majority Opinion at 712.
. Majority Opinion at 712.
. Majority Opinion at 712.
. Majority Opinion at 712.
. Hogan, 197 F.3d at 1305 .
. 21 § 701.8.
. No money or property was taken so it is fair to assume that Williams did not intend to rob the victim.
. Additionally, this Court has upheld Second Degree Murder convictions challenged on the sufficiency of the evidence based upon analogous facts. Dickson v. State, 761 P.2d 860 (Okl.Cr.1988)(defendant shot victim once in the head at close range but asserted that he did not intend to hurt victim); Dorsey v. State, 739 P.2d 528 (Okl.Cr.1987)(defendant armed himself with knife, started a fight with the victim, and intentionally stabbed him); Foster v. State, 657 P.2d 166 (Okl.Cr.1983)(defendant stabbed her newborn baby multiple times upon birth and placed it in a trash can). Although this is not the standard for review, it is clearly persuasive in evaluating whether there was sufficient evidence to support the instruction. Moreover, based upon the foregoing cases, it is obvious that this Court would have upheld Williams's conviction for Second Degree Murder.
. In the future, I would advise trial courts to liberally construe the evidence in favor of instructing juries on lesser included offenses. Central to our system of justice is allowing a jury to decide a defendant's guilt or innocence on an informed basis. Allowing a jury to choose between acquittal and two or more possible convictions only further insures that a verdict is fair and just.