concluding that cross-examination by "merely ask[ing] [witness] questions about the prior [forgery] conviction” was proper because "[attempted forgery is a crime involving dishonesty and conduct that goes to ... truthfulness as a witness” and because there was "no indication that the State attempted to impeach [witness] by introducing extrinsic evidence”
How later courts described this case
- concluding that cross-examination by "merely ask[ing] [witness] questions about the prior [forgery] conviction” was proper because "[attempted forgery is a crime involving dishonesty and conduct that goes to ... truthfulness as a witness” and because there was "no indication that the State attempted to impeach [witness] by introducing extrinsic evidence”
- recognizing that NRS 50.085(3) “permits impeaching a witness on cross- 7 examination with questions about specific acts as long as the impeachment pertains to truthfulness or untruthfulness” (quoting Collman v. State, 116 Nev. 8 687, 703, 7 P.3d 426, 436 (2000))
- recognizing that NRS 50.085(3) "permits impeaching a witness on cross- examination with questions about specific acts as long as the impeachment pertains to truthfulness or untruthfulness" (quoting Collman u. State, 116 Nev. 687 , 703, 7 P.3d 426, 436 (2000))
- explaining that "[Wisparaging remarks directed toward defense counsel have absolutely no place in a courtroom, and clearly constitute misconduct," and that disparaging legitimate defense tactics is also misconduct (internal quotation marks omitted)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
*901 Agosti, J.,
with whom Maupin, J., agrees, concurring:
I write separately to express my disagreement with that portion of the majority’s analysis which characterizes as misconduct the State’s remarks in closing argument concerning defense expert testimony. I see a great difference between disparaging or belittling an expert as “[t]he hired gun from Hot Tub Country” 1 and calling an expert “high falootin’,” which is hyperbole, but not misconduct. I also believe that the money charged by an expert is very proper impeachment material and properly referred to in argument. In this instance, the State’s reference to the fact that Clark County paid Mr. Esten’s fee is not misconduct. The prosecutor’s statement in this case is a far cry from the comment in Sipsas, 2 where the prosecutor’s remark was calculated to make the jurors feel cheated as taxpayers and to thereby build resentment against Sipsas, the defendant.
Having said that, I believe that even without its determination of prosecutorial misconduct the majority’s conclusion that Butler is entitled to a new sentencing hearing is proper.
Sipsas v. State, 102 Nev. 119, 124-25 , 716 P.2d 231, 234 (1986).
Id. at 125 , 716 P.2d at 234-35 .