The opinion
LUMPKIN, Presiding Judge:
concur in part/dissent in part.
1 1 I concur in affirming the convictions in this case. However, I must dissent to the modification of the sentences. The Court's decision misstates the law, conflicts with existing case law, and creates confusion in our jurisprudence rather than clarifying it. 1 This *1274 is most apparent in the Court's conclusion that the R.P. evidence "did not resolve any disputed issue in the current case" and was not necessary for the State's burden of proof. This is not the standard of review for the admissibility of other erimes evidence. This Court has repeatedly held:
To be admissible, evidence of uncharged offenses or bad acts must be probative of a disputed issue of the crime charged, there must be a visible connection between the crimes, evidence of the other erime(s) must be necessary to support the State's burden of proof, proof of the other crime(s) must be clear and convincing, the probative value of the evidence must outweigh the prejudice to the accused and the trial court must issue contemporaneous and final limiting instructions. (emphasis added)
Eizember v. State, 2007 OK CR 29, ¶ 76 , 164 P.3d 208, 230 ; Lott v. State, 2004 OK CR 27, ¶ 40 , 98 P.3d 318, 334-335 ; Welch v. State, 2000 OK CR 8, ¶ 8 , 2 P.3d 356, 365 ; Bryan v. State, 1997 OK CR 15 , ¶ 33, 935 P.2d 338 , 356 citing to Burks v. State, 1979 OK CR 10 , 594 P.2d 771 , overruled in part on other grounds, Jones v. State, 1989 OK CR 7 , 772 P.2d 922 . We have also phrased it as "[the evidence must go to a disputed issue and be necessary to support the State's burden of proof." James v. State, 2007 OK CR 1, ¶ 3 , 152 P.3d 255, 256-57 (emphasis added).
T2 Further, with the benefit of hindsight, the Court makes an "after the fact" determination that the State did not need the other crimes evidence to prove its case. However, that is a fact not known at the time of trial when the trial judge is making a decision on the admissibility of evidence. Of what relevance is the Court's statement that the "crimes of September 29, 2005, appear to be crimes of opportunity, unlike the crime against [R.P.], which involved breaking into a locked apartment, over seven hours after the doors had been locked and three hours after the lights had been turned off"? This is pure supposition and conjecture which has nothing to do with applying the Rule of Law established by this Court. In fact, this type of speculation is in conflict with our recent decision in Williams v. State, 2008 OK CR 19, ¶ 44 , 188 P.3d 208 wherein we said:
This Court should not be in the business of weighing the similarities against the dissimilarities. When there are enough similarities between the two erimes to support the trial court's decision, then we must give deference to the trial court's decision. Onee that threshold is met, any differences in the two crimes go to the weight of the evidence and not to the admissibility.
11 3 Judge Lewis's language was very clear in Williams. The Court's analysis in this case is inconsistent with Williams and merely creates confusion as to what is required of trial judges in determining whether § 2404(B) evidence is admissible at trial. Is the trial judge to look at the motives of the State rather than the objective evidence presented? Is the trial judge supposed to divine the effect the evidence would have on the jury and whether the jury would find sufficient evidence to convict without the other crimes evidence? Hopefully not, because that is not the role of the trial judge and it has nothing to do with objectively determining the admissibility of evidence.
T4 The trial court in this case made a factual finding prior to admitting the § 2404(B) evidence, that finding is supported by the record and not clearly erroneous. That is the end of the analysis. See Stouffer v. State, 2006 OK CR 46, ¶ 60 , 147 P.3d 245 , 263 where we said:
The admission of this evidence, as with all evidence, is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. The introduction of evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial court; the decision will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion. Pickens v. State, 2001 OK CR 3, ¶ 21 , 19 P.3d 866, 876 . An abuse of discretion is "a clearly erroneous conclusion and judgment, one that is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts presented." C.L.F. v. State, 1999 OK CR 12, ¶ 5 , 989 P.2d 945, 946 .
15 Speculation by an appellate court as to whether the evidence was needed due to the *1275 fact the State had a strong case is not an appropriate part of appellate review. Appellate jurisdiction is that power and jurisdiction to review and correct those proceedings of inferior courts brought for determination in the manner provided by law. Carder v. Court of Criminal Appeals, 1978 OK 130, ¶ 12 , 595 P.2d 416, 419 . As a result of this appellate jurisdiction, this Court is tasked with the responsibility of reviewing actions in the District Court to determine if the facts developed therein support the District Court's decision under the law, not inserting our own personal views of the evidence.
T 6 As the trial judge's decision in this case is in compliance with this Court's prior decisions and there is a factual basis to support that decision, there is no plain error, and the judgment and sentences should be affirmed.
. My colleague's extensive footnotes seeking to *1274 justify the deviation I have noted seems to fit William Shakespeare's great line from Hamlet, Act III, Scene II, "The [gentleman] protests too much, methinks".