In Re Oklahoma Development Finance Authority

BOUDREAU, J.,

dissenting, with whom OPALA, V.C.J. and LAVENDER, J., join:

¶ 1 I dissent from today’s opinion which approves bond proposals for the renovation and expansion of two private industrial facilities without an antecedent vote of the people. With this opinion and two previous opinions approving bond proposals, Application of Oklahoma Capitol Improvement Authority, 1998 OK 25 , 958 P.2d 759 and Fent v. Oklahoma Capitol Improvement Authority, 1999 OK 64 , 984 P.2d 200 , this Court has abandoned its traditional role as protector of our state constitution in favor of a partnership role with the Legislature promoting economic development in Oklahoma. These three opinions allow the Legislature free rein to create debts to be retired solely or partially from future state tax revenues while circumventing a vote of the people. They have, in effect, rendered our constitutional debt limitations meaningless.

I. OKLAHOMA CONSTITUTIONAL DEBT LIMITATIONS

¶2 The Oklahoma Constitution, art. 10, §§ 23, 24 and 25 specify the fundamental limitations on state debts. Section 23 requires the Legislature to balance the state budget annually and prohibits state agencies from incurring obligations in excess of the unencumbered balance of cash on hand. 1 The obvious intent of this section is to prohibit multi-year debts and to place state government on a pay-as-you-go cash basis. 2 Section 25 permits the creation of a multi-year debt if the Legislature enacts a measure that distinctly specifies the object of the debt and provides for payment of the debt. 3 Section 25 requires that the measure then be approved by the people at a general election. *1090 Very clearly, Section 25 reserves in the people of Oklahoma the power to determine whether the state should incur multi-year debts other than as may be necessary in certain emergency situations. 4

II. TODAY’S OPINION

¶ 3 In approving industrial facility bonds without an antecedent vote of the people, today’s opinion characterizes the bonds as moral obligations under Fent v. Oklahoma Capitol Improvement Authority, 1999 OK 64 , 984 P.2d 200 (1999 Fent). The opinion reasons that these bonds do not create a legally binding obligation against the state nor pledge the full faith and credit of the state because language in the authorizing statute and on the face of the bonds disavows the creation of a state debt. 5 The opinion views this ipse dixit language as sufficient to avoid any legal obligation on the part of the state to retire the bonds. Accordingly, the opinion eoncludes the bonds are not subject to our constitutional debt limitations.

¶4 In reaching the conclusion that the proposed bonds will be moral obligations, the opinion ignores the language in the authorizing statutes that provide for the bonds to be retired from state income tax revenues to be collected over a multi-year period. 6 The Oklahoma Quality Jobs Incentive Leverage Act (Act) identifies four sources for retirement of the bonds. 7 These sources are also specified in the bond indenture. 8 Except the guaranty of the private industry receiving the benefit of the bond proceeds, all sources consist of state income tax revenues. The first source is a special fund in the State Treasury known as the Quality Jobs Program Incentive Leverage Fund 9 consisting of monies from the Quality Jobs Program Incentive Payment Fund 10 and income tax *1091 revenues withheld from employees of the private industry. 11 If the deposits in the special Leverage Fund are insufficient to pay the principal or interest on the bonds when due, then the private industry must make the payment under its guaranty executed for the benefit of the Oklahoma Development Finance Authority. 12 Upon default under the guaranty, state income tax revenues shall be apportioned in amounts sufficient to pay the obligations. 13

¶ 5 While characterizing the proposed bonds as moral obligations, the opinion also describes the bonds as self-liquidating under Application of Oklahoma Capitol Improvement Authority, 1998 OK 25 , 958 P.2d 759 (1998 OCIA). The opinion concludes that the bonds (thirty-six million dollars for Goodyear and twenty-nine million dollars for Miehelin) are self-liquidating because the primary source for retiring the bonds is the foregone quality jobs incentive payments which the Legislature declared to be an asset of the private entity. 14 Although the record shows that the amount of the foregone incentive payments is estimated to be just under two million dollars for each private industry, 15 the opinion indicates that these foregone benefits are in amounts sufficient to pay the bonds.

¶ 6 In applying the self-liquidating debt exception, the opinion ignores two important aspects of the exception. First, the exception is relevant only if the bonds are debts in the constitutional sense. If the Court truly views these bonds as moral obligations rather than multi-year debts, there is no need to consider the self-liquidating debt exception. Second, the exception applies only if the projects funded with the bond proceeds generate streams of revenue dedicated to retiring the bonds. While the opinion implies that the streams of revenue that will be generated by renovating and expanding the Goodyear tire plant in Lawton and the Miehelin tire plant in Ardmore and dedicated to retiring the bonds are the foregone quality jobs incentive payments, the real source of the payment will be future income tax revenues.

*1092 III. WHETHER A BOND ISSUE CONSTITUTES A STATE DEBT IN A CONSTITUTIONAL SENSE IS A LEGAL QUESTION TO BE DECIDED BY THIS COURT. FENT V. OKLAHOMA CAPITOL IMPROVEMENT AUTHORITY, 1999 OK 64 , 984 P.2d 200 , SHOULD BE OVERRULED TO THE EXTENT THAT IT ALLOWS THE LEGISLATURE TO AVOID THE AUTHORIZING OF STATE DEBT BY MERELY DECLARING THAT THE OBLIGATION WILL NOT CONSTITUTE A DEBT OF THE STATE.

¶ 7 The notion of appropriation-risk or moral obligation bonds emerged as part of the rationale in the 1998 OCIA opinion. In approving proposed highway improvement bonds authorized in 73 O.S.Supp.1997, § 168.6, the 1998 OCIA opinion reasoned that the highway bonds could be viewed as creating a moral obligation rather than creating a debt within the meaning of our state constitution because the statute did not bind future Oklahoma legislatures to make the anticipated appropriations. 16 It further reasoned that the full faith and credit of the state was not pledged by the appropriation-risk or moral obligation bonds because there was only the prospect as opposed to the promise of future appropriations to retire the bonds. 17 However, the holding of the 1998 OCIA opinion is not grounded in its appropriation-risk, moral-obligation discussion but rests squarely on the self-liquidating debt exception to the constitutional debt limitation provisions. 18

¶ 8 It was not until the 1999 Fent opinion that this Court’s approval of a bond issue without an antecedent vote of the people actually rested on the notion that an appropriation-risk or moral obligation of the state is not a debt under our Constitutional debt limitation provisions. 19 The 1999 Fent ease involved a bond proposal to fund the needs of several state agencies. Although the bonds would be retired with state revenues appropriated in subsequent years, the 1999 Fent opinion concluded that the bonds would not create a state debt in the constitutional sense. 20 The Court reasoned that succeeding legislative bodies would not be bound to appropriate future state revenues to the agen- *1093 eies to retire the bonds and therefore the bonds would not be legally enforceable obligations of the state but only appropriation-risk or moral obligations of the state. 21

¶ 9 In my view the 1999 Fent opinion should be overruled to the extent that it allows the Legislature to avoid the authorizing of state debt by merely declaring in a statute that the obligation shall not constitute a debt of the state. Whether a bond issue constitutes a state debt in a constitutional sense is a legal question to be decided by this Court. Boswell v. State, 1937 OK 727 , 181 Okla. 435 , 74 P.2d 940, 943 . It is certainly not a question to be decided by the stroke of a legislative pen. As this Court said in Boswell v. State, the Legislature might dictate that neither the full faith and credit nor the taxing power of the state will be pledged as security for the bonds, but it may not declare the legal character of the bond indenture. Id.

¶ 10 Before approving any proposed bond issue, this Court should thoroughly examine the financial realities of the proposed bond transaction without deference to the Legislature’s legal characterization of the bonds. In this regal’d, one commentator has observed that “the very use of the term ‘bond’ manifestly interweaves the idea of obligations, indebtedness, and liabilities.” 22 Certainly, the bond transactions in the 1998 OCIA case for highway improvement and in the 1999 Fent case for state building and equipment and in this case for private industrial facilities look and act like debt. In the previous cases, the bondholders conferred benefits upon the people of Oklahoma by providing funds for public improvement projects. In this ease, the bondholders will confer a benefit upon the people of Oklahoma by providing funds for economic development. It utterly defies belief that the bondholders would purchase these bonds without an implied commitment of the state’s general taxing power.

¶ 11 The notion of moral obligation is foreign to our American system of finance. Bankers and other lenders simply do not make multi-million dollar loans on moral promises of the borrowers to repay the loan. When the Legislature authorizes a state entity to issue bonds, bondholders expect the bonds to be backed by the state’s general taxing power. To maintain otherwise is just denying economic reality.

¶ 12 In his dissenting opinion in the 1998 OCIA, Justice Watt correctly perceived this economic reality when he said that “whether these proposed bonds are labeled ‘legal’ or ‘moral,’ the economic reality is that the State’s failure to repay the bondholders in full would be devastating to Oklahoma’s credit worthiness”. 23 Similarly, in his dissenting opinion in that case, Justice Lavender recognized that future legislatures will be bound to appropriate sufficient revenues to repay the bondholders and to rule otherwise “simply ignores the economic reality of the situation”. 24

¶ 13 In summary, the 1999 Fent opinion should be overruled to the extent that it supports the rationale that the Legislature may avoid creating a legally binding obligation against the state by simply saying so while diverting tax revenues to the obligation. By giving our legal imprimatur to this technique of circumvention we have opened the door to large-scale state deficit financing and rendered our constitutional debt limitations meaningless.

IV. THIS COURT SHOULD CLARIFY THE SELF-LIQUIDATING DEBT EXCEPTION TO ART. 10, §§ 23 and 25 OF THE OKLAHOMA CONSTITUTION BY DEFINING THE ELEMENTS OF THE EXCEPTION.

¶ 14 Although bonds evidence debt owed by the issuing entity, 25 this Court has fash *1094 ioned a self-liquidating debt exception to the state debt limitations in Okla. Const., art. 10, §§ 23 and 25. The self-liquidating debt exception originated in Baker v. Carter, 1933 OK 484 , 165 Okla. 116 , 25 P.2d 747 , wherein the Court was asked to approve a bond proposal for the construction of a state college dormitory which dedicated the rents paid by the students to a special fund to retire the bonds. In approving the bonds without an antecedent vote of the people, Baker v. Carter ruled that the constitutional debt limitation provisions were inapplicable to bonds payable solely out of a special fund of revenues generated by the improvement made with the bond proceeds. Id., 25 P.2d at 758 .

¶ 15 Shortly thereafter, Boswell v. State, 1937 OK 727 , 181 Okla. 435 , 74 P.2d 940 , clarified the special fund language in Baker v. Carter, expressly defining and limiting the self-liquidating debt exception to bond proposals which called for the bond proceeds to be used for projects that would generate revenue directly from the project users and that revenue would be the sole source for retiring the bonds. 26 That case presented a bond proposal for highway improvement with the bonds to be retired from gasoline excise tax earmarked for deposit in the special State Highway Commission Note Fund of 1937 in the State Treasury. Boswell v. State determined that the bonds were to be retired with revenue raised by the state taxing power and consequently, the project and bonds were not self-liquidating.

¶ 16 Our early cases never applied the exception to bond obligations that would be liquidated or retired by an infusion of funds from the general revenues of the state. Boswell v. State, 74 P.2d at 949 . As initially developed, the self-liquidating debt exception to our constitutional debt limitation provisions applied to bond obligations to be retired only from a stream of revenue derived from the project constructed with the bond proceeds. Accordingly, we applied the exception to dormitories, public lodges, toll roads and other projects that can be leased or rented or used as collateral in the event of default on the obligation. See, Baker v. Carter, supra., Application of Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma, 1945 OK 224 , 195 Okla. 641 , 161 P.2d 447 , and Application of Board of Regents for Oklahoma Agricultural and Mechanical Colleges, 1946 OK 110 , 196 Okla. 622 , 167 P.2d 883 (wherein the bonds financed construction of dormitories at our state' colleges and universities and were retired from the fees and rents paid by students.); Application of Oklahoma Planning and Resources Board, 1949 OK 34 , 201 Okla. 178 , 203 P.2d 415 (wherein the bonds financed construction of a lodge, cabins and a restaurant at a state park and were retired from the charges for the conveniences paid by the park visitors); and Application of Oklahoma Turnpike Authority, 1950 OK 208 , 203 Okla. 335 , 221 P.2d 795 (wherein the bonds financed construction of turnpike roadways and were retired from the toll fees paid by the highway users).

*1095 ¶ 17 However, in the 1998 OCIA opinion, this Court once again addressed the self-liquidating exception. In approving bonds for the construction and maintenance of highways, the Court determined the bonds were self-liquidating because prepaid direct and dedicated taxes on fuels and user fees were specifically earmarked to retire the bonds on an annual basis. 27 In the Court’s view, the combination of taxes and fees created a revenue stream directly related to the construction and maintenance of highways. 28

¶ 18 The 1998 OCIA opinion expanded the self-liquidating debt exception, approving the type of financing that we specifically rejected in Boswell v. State, supra. Today’s opinion goes even further, approving a state entity’s proposed transactions to create multi-year debts, the proceeds of which will be invested in private industrial facilities for the purpose of economic development, to be paid from dedicated future income tax revenues. Our recent jurisprudence has created a self-liquidating debt exception that is without boundaries. It has allowed the Legislature, contrary to the teachings of Boswell v. State, supra, to authorize multi-year debts by creating so-called special funds composed of future state revenues that could be available for governmental functions.

¶ 19 In my opinion, we should reaffirm our holding in Boswell v. State, supra, and specifically disapprove of the Legislature’s attempt to divert future tax revenues to the payment of public obligations without the consent of the voters. In so doing, this Court should clarify the self-liquidating debt exception to the constitutional debt limitation provisions by setting forth the elements of the exception. 29

Y. CONCLUSION

¶20 In summary, I dissent from today’s opinion because it allows a state entity to borrow money to be repaid from income tax collections over a twenty-year period without an antecedent vote of the people. Were I writing for the Court, we would overrule Fent v. Oklahoma Capitol Improvement Authority, 1999 OK 64 , 984 P.2d 200 , to the extent that it allows the legislature to avoid the authorizing of state debt by merely declaring that an obligation will not constitute a debt of the state. We would also clarify the self-liquidating debt exception to the constitutional debt limitation provisions by defining the elements of the exception.

¶ 21 In accordance with our state constitution, a bond issue must be submitted to the electorate for approval at a general election. Notwithstanding that the purpose of a bond proposal may be commendable, this Court must reject proposed public financing that is contrary to this fundamental law. It is time for us to put a firm cap on debt limitation escape devices and return to our pre 1998 jurisprudence.

.Art. 10, § 23, reads in pertinent part:

The state shall never create or authorize the creation of any debt or obligation, or fund or pay any deficit, against the state, or any department, institution or agency thereof, regardless of its form or the source of money from which it is to be paid, except as may be provided in this section and in Sections 24 and 25 of Article X of the Constitution of the State of Oklahoma.

To ensure a balanced annual budget, pursuant to the limitations contained in the foregoing, procedures are herewith established as follows:

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5.... Any department, institution or agency of the state operating on revenues derived from any law or laws which allocate the revenues thereof to such department, institution or agency shall not incur obligations in excess of the unencumbered balance of cash on hand....

. State ex rel. Kerr v. Grand River Dam Authority, 1945 OK 9, ¶ 11 , 195 Okla. 8 , 154 P.2d 946, 950 .

. Article 10, § 25 provides:

Except the debts specified in sections twenty-three and twenty-four of this article, no debts shall be hereafter contracted by or on behalf of this State, unless such debt shall be authorized by law for some work or object, to be distinctly specified therein; and such law shall impose and provide for the collection of a direct annual tax to pay, and sufficient to pay, the interest on such debt as it falls due, and also to pay and discharge the principal of such debt within twenty-five years from the time of the contracting thereof. No such law shall take effect until it shall, at a general election, have been submitted to the people and have received a majority of all the votes cast for and against it at such election. On the final passage of such bill *1090 in either House of the Legislature, the question shall be taken by yeas and nays, to be duly entered on the journals thereof, and shall be: "Shall this bill pass, and ought the same to receive the sanction of the people?”

. Article 10, § 24 provides:

In addition to the above limited power to contract debts, the State may contract debts to repel invasion, suppress insurrection or to defend the State in war; but the money arising from the contracting of such debts shall be applied to the purpose for which it was raised, or to repay such debts, and to no other purpose whatever.

. The face of the bond will state that "IT SHALL NEVER CONSTITUTE AN INDEBTEDNESS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA WITHIN THE MEANING OF ANY CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION” and it “SHALL NEVER CONSTITUTE ... A CHARGE AGAINST THE GENERAL CREDIT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA OR TAXING POWER OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA."

. Issuance of these bonds is authorized in the Oklahoma Quality Jobs Incentive Leverage Act, 2002 Okla. Sess. Laws, ch. 299, 68 O.S.Supp. 2002, §§ 3651, etseq.

. Id.

. Article IV of the Indenture of Trust recognizes that the trust estate, from which the bonds are to be retired, will consist of state income tax revenues that 1) would have been paid to Goodyear or Michelin as quality jobs incentive payments, 2) will be attributable to withholding from employees of Goodyear or Michelin, and, 3) will be apportioned to cover any deficit after payment or default under the guaranty agreement.

. All monies in the Quality Jobs Program Incentive Leverage Fund in the State Treasury, created in 68 O.S.Supp.2002, § 3657, are to be used for the payment of principal, interest and other costs associated with the issuance of obligations pursuant to the Act.

. The Oklahoma Quality Jobs Program Act, 1993 Okla. Sess. Laws, ch. 275, 68 O.S.Supp. 1993, §§ 3601 et seq., authorizes the Oklahoma Tax Commission to make quarterly incentive payments to qualifying establishments for new direct jobs. The incentive payments are calculated upon a net benefits formula and may be claimed for no longer than a ten-year period. § 3604. The Oklahoma Tax Commission deposits a portion of the withholding income taxes into the Quality Jobs Program Incentive Payment Fund in the State Treasuiy and pays the claimed incentive payments from that special fund. § 3605. The Oklahoma Tax Commission is directed to transfer monies from the Quality Jobs Program Incentive Payment Fund to the Quality Jobs Program Incentive Leverage Fund in the amounts that a qualifying establishment would be entitled to claim for new jobs but foregoes under the Oklahoma Quality Jobs Incentive Leverage Act. 68 O.S.Supp.2002, § 3658.

. Quality Jobs Program Incentive Payment Fund consists of state income tax revenues in amounts equal to the incentive payment which the private industry receiving the bond proceeds might be entitled to claim as a new jobs benefit incentive and which the Oklahoma Tax Commission transfers from its holding account to the Quality Jobs Program Incentive Payment Fund in the State Treasury and then to the Quality Jobs Program Incentive Leverage Fund. See note 9 supra. The Oklahoma Tax Commission is also directed to apportion withholding income taxes to the Quality Jobs Program Incentive Leverage Fund. 68 O.S.Supp.2002, § 3659. Withholding tax refers to the mechanism for collection of the state income tax from the employee via the employer. 68 O.S.2001, §§ 2385.1 et seq. Withholding tax, when remitted to the Oklahoma Tax Commission, are state income tax revenues.

. The guaranty is required by 68 O.S.Supp. 2002, § 3654(M). The Act also provides that the private industry "shall be liable to the State of Oklahoma and the Oklahoma Development Finance Authority for the amount of any required principal or interest payment” when the private industry “ceases to qualify for an incentive payment”. 68 O.S.Supp.2002, § 3660.

. Section 13 of the 2002 legislative measure amended the income tax apportionment statute, 68 O.S.2001, § 2352. Although § 2352 has been subsequently amended, the changes made in 2002 remain intact. In the 2002 changes, the Legislature mandated that for fiscal year 2004 and subsequent fiscal years, before any other apportionments of income tax revenues are made, the Oklahoma Tax Commission shall apportion collections of the income tax levied in 68 O.S.2001, § 2355 to the Quality Jobs Program Incentive Leverage Fund in amounts as may be certified by the Oklahoma Development Finance Authority to be necessary to pay the obligations. 2002 Okla. Sess. Laws, ch. 299, § 13.

. 68 O.S.Supp.2002, § 3658(B).

. The Oklahoma Development Finance Authority proposes to borrow $36,720,000.00 for Goodyear while Goodyear has agreed to forego a total of $1,969,748.80 in incentive payments and $29,615,000.00 for Miehelin while Miehelin also has also agreed to forego a total of $1,969,748.80. See, Applicant's Appendix, Exhibits M and N, unsigned certificates of the Secretary of Commerce of the State of Oklahoma. Also, it is noteworthy that according to the statute, the foregone incentive benefits are to be paid quarterly over a ten-year period, 68 O.S.Supp. *1092 2002, § 3604(A), while the proposed bonds will have a twenty-year maturity date.

. Application of Oklahoma Capitol Improvement Authority, 958 P.2d at 771 .

. Application of Oklahoma Capitol Improvement Authority, 958 P.2d at 774 . .

. Approval of the proposed bonds in the 1998 OCIA opinion rested on the conclusion that "THE BONDS ARE SELF-LIQUIDATING” in ¶ 10 and that the "bonds are, in the most elemental sense, 'self-liquidating'” in ¶ 11. The 1998 OCIA opinion emphasized that its approval of the proposed bonds rested on the self-liquidating debt exception when, at the beginning of its discussion of other arguments presented in support of die bond proposal, it said at ¶ 19:

The analysis presented in Proposition II demonstrates that the dedicated revenue stream described in the authorizing statute satisfies the standard of self-liquidation as described in our prior decisions. Even if it did not, or even if the highway proposal were not fully self-liquidating, this Court's prior decisions would not warrant its invalidation. (Bold added.)

Application of Oklahoma Capitol Improvement Authority, 958 P.2d at 766 . Accordingly, the discussion regarding moral obligations in the 1998 OCIA opinion was not essential to the Court’s resolution of the case and could be viewed, at its very best, as persuasive judicial dicta. Stark v. Watson, 1961 OK 17 , 359 P.2d 191, 196 .

. In Application of Oklahoma Capitol Improvement Authority, 1960 OK 207, ¶¶ 11-13 , 355 P.2d 1028, 1031 , this Court concluded that a state debt was not created where the Legislature authorized the borrowing of money for acquisition or construction of a project to be used by a state agency in order to carry out its duties and the borrowed money was to be repaid from rentals paid by the state agency. This Court recognized, in that case, that the state office building project did not fit into the self-liquidating debt exception because the revenue to be generated by the project would be rents paid by state and federal agencies occupying space in the project office building and the rents paid by the state agencies would necessarily be from state revenue. Considering whether future legislatures may be bound to appropriate public funds to pay the rents to retire the bonds, i.e., appropriation-risk bonds, the Court observed that any contract to pay money in the future creates a debt and concluded that governmental contracts for future installments for services to be received in the future are excluded from the provisions governing governmental indebtedness. Id., at 355 P.2d at 1032-33 .

. Fent v. Oklahoma Capitol Improvement Authority, 984 P.2d at 210.

. Id., 984 P.2d at 208.

. Oklahoma Constitutional Law: Highway Robbery: In re Oklahoma Capitol Improvement Authority: The Eulogy for Oklahoma Constitutional Debt Limitations, by Brian Edward Wheeler, 53 Okla. L.R. 319, 335 (Summer, 2000).

. Application of Oklahoma Capitol Improvement Authority, supra., dissenting opinion by Watt, J., at 958 P.2d 787 , 794.

. Application of Oklahoma Capitol Improvement Authority, supra., dissenting opinion by Lavender, L, at 958 P.2d 778 , 779.

. It is indisputable that bonds are evidence of a debt in a constitutional sense. See, Okla. Const., art. 10, § 29.

. Restricting the special fund theory in Baker v. Carter to debts to fund self-liquidating projects, the Boswell opinion reasoned:

¶ 42 It is said that the "special fund doctrine” has been recognized and applied by this court in the case of Baker v. Carter, 165 Okla. 116 , 25 P.2d 747 , and so it has. It is urged that the recognition of said doctrine in that case constitutes a precedent for the validity of the act under consideration herein. In that case, however, a public corporation, the Agricultural and Mechanical College of this state, was authorized to issue certain certificates of indebtedness for the purpose of constructing a dormitory, the sole provision for payment being in revenues produced from the rental of the conveniences of said dormitory. The revenues which were to create the special fund had no existence prior to the issuance of the obligations; they were to arise wholly out of the property created by the use of the proceeds of the bonds authorized. The fund created was in no sense derived from a tax of any kind. No property of the state already producing income was to be utilized in any way to help create the special fund. The public revenues of the state were not concerned. The contemplated asset was to be a self-liquidating project....

¶ 47 A careful study of the various authorities cited by defendants discloses that in some jurisdictions the failure to observe the distinction between a particular fund derived from a specific tax levied for a specific purpose, which has been termed a "special fund,” and a fund partaking of the nature of a trust fund derivable from a self-liquidating project under the "special fund doctrine," has led to a confused interpretation and to an unwarranted extension of the "special fund doctrine,” which we refuse to follow.

Boswell v. State, 74 P.2d at 949-50 .

. Application of Oklahoma Capitol Improvement Authority, 958 P.2d at 764 .

. Id.

.See, Application of Oklahoma Capitol Improvement Authority, supra., dissenting opinion by Opala, J., at 958 P.2d 779 , 780-81, for one suggestion of the elements of the exception.