Kavanaugh v. West Sonoma County Union High School District

CHIN, J., Dissenting.

I join in Justice Brown’s dissenting opinion. I write separately to explain further my reasons for my dissent. In my view, the majority misinterprets Education Code section 44916 1 and oversteps its authority by micromanaging school districts.

Justice Brown correctly notes that, under section 44916, “ ‘the time of initial employment’ ” has the same meaning as “the time the school district *927 ‘hires’ the new teacher.” (Dis. opn. of Brown, I., post, at pp. 929, 931.) The majority does not dispute that the West Sonoma County Union High School District’s (the District) governing board has the statutory authority to hire, employ, and classify its employees (maj. opn., ante, at p. 917) or that the written notice is necessarily given after the school district hires and employs the employee. 2 Impliedly recognizing that written notice cannot precede “the time of initial employment” or the time the school district hires the new teacher, the majority holds that a school district’s governing board must give written notification of salary and employment status to certificated teachers on or before their first day of paid service. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 921 and fn. 7.) “Notification as late as a teacher’s first day of paid service to the district . . . represents the last day the governing board can comply with section 44916 to avoid the automatic reclassification provided for in the statute.” (Id. at p. 921, fn. 7.) To satisfy section 44916, a school district’s governing board must now convene and formally “hire” its employees before the first day of paid service or delegate its hiring power.

The majority recognizes that its holding is unsupported by either the statute’s language or its legislative history. Instead, it cites the statute’s purpose to benefit teachers by requiring timely written notice of employment terms. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 920-921.) I agree that teachers should receive timely notice of their employment terms, and that it is good practice for any employer to give written notice of employment status before an employee actually begins work. However, obvious, and major, practical problems exist in convening a school board meeting before every new employee begins actual work, especially when a teacher must be called in on short notice. The unexpected often occurs in public education. Often, for example, a teacher must be hired to start teaching quickly, perhaps next Monday, to fill an immediate and unexpected need. The majority is now telling the school district—without support from either the statutory language or its history— that it may not allow that teacher to start immediately without risking a reclassification that the school board may find inappropriate in light of the district’s needs as a whole. This court should not engage in this sort of micromanagement. It should not squeeze public schools into a bureaucratic straitjacket that may prevent them from meeting the needs of their students.

The Legislature used the general term “[a]t the time of initial employment” to afford school districts flexibility in deciding how and when it *928 employs teachers to meet both its routine and unexpected needs. In meeting students’ needs, we must not saddle school districts with inflexible bureaucratic mandates, especially ones that, as here, are judicially created.

Using this case as illustration, the majority reasons that written notice before a teacher actually begins work “avoids the kind of bait-and-switch scenario in which a teacher begins the school year believing his or her status is probationary (with the accompanying level of job protection) only to discover after the year has started—when it is too late to find another position—that the position is only temporary.” (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 921-922.) The majority declares that “had the District provided notice . . . on or before Kavanaugh’s first day of paid service to the District, this litigation could have been avoided.” (Id. at p. 922.) The record reflects otherwise.

It is undisputed that Kavanaugh received written notice of her employment status as a temporary teacher in a letter dated September 13, 1999, only two weeks after she began work. It is undisputed that Kavanaugh had left her previous teaching job for a teaching position in the District for the 1999-2000 school year. It appears undisputed that she taught in the District for most, if not all, of that school year. As a probationary teacher, Kavanaugh could have been nonreelected for the following year for economic reasons, provided the District notified her by March 15, 2000. (§§ 44949, subd. (a), 44955, subds. (a), (c).) As a temporary teacher, Kavanaugh could have been nonreelected for the following year for economic reasons, provided the District notified her “before the end of the school year.” (§ 44954, subd. (b).) Thus, Kavanaugh would not have been automatically entitled to more than one school year of teaching in the District, whether employed as a probationary or a temporary teacher. Indeed, the record reflects that Kavanaugh only had taken a one-year leave of absence from her previous teaching job, thus indicating that she was not unequivocally relying on her new teaching job as more than a one-year position.

Kavanaugh’s job classification matters in this case only because the District believed that Kavanaugh was a temporary employee. It accordingly gave notification of nonreelection on April 20, 2000, instead of on March 15, 2000, dates which occurred many months after Kavanaugh received her written notice. In giving notification of nonreelection on April 20th, the District reasonably relied on its September 13, 1999, letter that Kavanaugh’s position was a temporary one. Thus, the timing of the written notice appears to be immaterial in this case. In finding that the written notice of job classification was untimely, and deeming Kavanaugh a probationary employee under section 44916, the majority places form over substance.

*929 Kavanaugh received timely written notice within the meaning of section 44916. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

Baxter, J., concurred.

All further statutory references are to the Education Code.

Section 44916 states, in part, that “If a school district hires a certificated person as a temporary employee, the written statement shall clearly indicate the temporary nature of the employment and the length of time for which the person is being employed.” The latter clause is clearly dependent on the former clause.