explaining that AIf a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment . . . permits police to search the whole vehicle without more@ and rejecting the proposition that exigent circumstances are necessary to trigger the Aautomobile exception@ to the warrant requirement
How later courts described this case
- explaining that AIf a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment . . . permits police to search the whole vehicle without more@ and rejecting the proposition that exigent circumstances are necessary to trigger the Aautomobile exception@ to the warrant requirement
- explaining that “If a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment . . . permits police to search the whole vehicle without more” and rejecting the proposition that exigent circumstances are necessary to trigger the “automobile exception” to the warrant requirement
- holding that probable cause supported police search of a vehicle when a “reliable confidential informant” told officers that “a rented red Toyota” with a particular license number would contain drugs
- holding exigent circumstances need not exist, be yond a vehicle’s inherent mobility, and probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
*468 Justice Breyer,
with whom Justice Stevens joins, dissenting.
I agree that the Court’s per curiam opinion correctly states the law, but because respondent’s counsel is not a member of this Court’s bar and did not wish to become one, respondent has not filed a brief in opposition to the petition for certiorari. I believe we should not summarily reverse in a criminal case, irrespective of the merits, where the respondent is represented by a counsel unable to file a response, without first inviting an attorney to file a brief as amicus curiae in response to the petition for certiorari. For this reason, I dissent.