considering “the nature of [numerous stab] wounds and surrounding circumstances,” including no evidence of heat of passion, in holding that no instruction on manslaughter was required in a capital murder trial
How later courts described this case
- considering “the nature of [numerous stab] wounds and surrounding circumstances,” including no evidence of heat of passion, in holding that no instruction on manslaughter was required in a capital murder trial
- prior drug conviction of murder victim not admissible
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
LANE, Presiding Judge,
concurring in results:
While I agree with the majority’s holding affirming the death sentence in this case, I find several aspects of the majority’s reasoning troublesome.
This Court has had extensive opportunity to analyze the meaning, limitation and application of the aggravating circumstance, heinous, atrocious or cruel. See Stout v. State, 817 P.2d 737 (Okl.Cr.App.1991); Nuckols v. State, 805 P.2d 672 (Okl.Cr.1991); Cartwright v. State, 778 P.2d 479 (Okl.Cr.1989); Nguyen v. State, 769 P.2d 167 (Okl.Cr.1988); Stouffer v. State, 742 P.2d 562 (Okl.Cr.1987); Castro v. State, 745 P.2d 394 (Okl.Cr.1987). If this analysis has taught us anything, it is that extreme precision is necessary in the language we use to both define and limit the application of this aggravating circumstance.
I believe the majority misstates Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instructions — Criminal No. 436 which first defines and then properly limits the application of this aggravating circumstance. The majority states this instruction “explains heinous, atrocious or cruel to mean those crimes where the death of the victim was preceded by torture of the victim or serious physical abuse.” (majority at 634) (emphasis added).
Careful reading of Instruction No. 436 makes clear that it limits the application of this aggravating circumstance to those crimes where the death of the victim was preceded by torture or serious physical abuse. The instruction defines “heinous” as extremely wicked or shockingly evil; “atrocious” as outrageously wicked and vile; and “cruel” as pitiless, or designed to inflict a high degree of pain, utter indifference to, or enjoyment of, the sufferings of others. While this explication of the text of Instruction No. 436 given to the appellant’s jury does not change the holding of the Court, I believe we must pay extremely close attention to the exact meaning and usage of the words in the jury instruction, *637 particularly when it is the subject of continuing constitutional challenge.