The opinion
*803 MOSK, J.
I dissent. From the earliest days of California jurisprudence, the place of an individual’s residence has been a matter of intent. As stated in Estate of Brady (1918) 177 Cal. 537, 539 [ 171 P. 303 ], “the place of his residence depend[s] upon his intention as manifested by his acts and declarations on the subject.” To the same general effect is Chambers v. Hathaway (1921) 187 Cal. 104, 105 [ 200 P. 931 ]: “legal residence is almost altogether a question of his intent.”
However, it is also clear that in determining residence “the courts look to a person’s actions as well as to his statement of intent” (Balff v. Public Welfare Department (1957) 151 Cal.App.2d 784, 788 [ 312 P.2d 360 ]). Here, the criminal court looked beyond petitioner’s intent to his actions and found him guilty of felonious conduct. He was placed on probation and the convictions were subsequently reduced to misdemeanors.
I recognize that we cannot go behind that conviction. I cite the settled law on residence intent merely to suggest that petitioner’s conduct, though found to be improper in connection with a political campaign, was not as egregious as the majority claim.
The hearing panel of the State Bar saw and heard the witnesses, and recommended suspension from the practice of law for one year. By a vote of seven to four, the review department increased the proposed discipline to disbarment. This wide disparity in the discipline recommended by the two bar agencies makes it all the more important for us to exercise wisely our independent judgment as to the appropriate discipline.
In my view, disbarment under these circumstances is punitive and excessive for a petitioner who has no prior record of misconduct. I would adopt the recommendation of the hearing panel and suspend petitioner for one year, to be followed by a period of several years on supervised probation.