holding that members of the Arizona Board of Pardons and Paroles were liable “only for the grossly negligent or reckless release of a highly dangerous prisoner” but enjoyed “freedom from suit for reasonable decisions”
How later courts described this case
- holding that members of the Arizona Board of Pardons and Paroles were liable “only for the grossly negligent or reckless release of a highly dangerous prisoner” but enjoyed “freedom from suit for reasonable decisions”
- “The board members should not bear liability for taking the risk allocated to them as a statutory duty.”
- if the prisoner's record reveals violent propensities and there is absolutely no reasonable basis for a belief he had changed, a decision to release him will be grossly negligent or reckless, subjecting the board to liability
- immunity ceases “only for the grossly negligent or reckless” conduct
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Disagreed with by Donahoo v. State, 479 So. 2d 1188 (1985)
We disagree with the views expressed in Grimm and its progeny, and we take this opportunity to declare that we will follow the line of cases holding that in order to establish liability on the part of state officials, the plaintiff must plead and prove that the officials knew or should have known that an aggressor might be a danger to a specific individual.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Taggart v. State, 118 Wash. 2d 195 (1992)
Grimm is distinguishable from the present case because the Arizona statute requires a "reasonable probability" that the parole applicant is rehabilitated, whereas RCW 9.95.100 only requires that the Board form the opinion that rehabilitation is complete.
The opinion
STRUCKMEYER, V. C. J.,
concurring.
I concur in the dissent of Justice Hays.