explaining that “[w]e know of no case that interprets or applies ORS 136.425 independently of the common-law rules on confessions and admissions” and holding that the statute excludes confessions induced by threats or promises
How later courts described this case
- explaining that “[w]e know of no case that interprets or applies ORS 136.425 independently of the common-law rules on confessions and admissions” and holding that the statute excludes confessions induced by threats or promises
- holding that “the key to the ‘free and voluntary’ character of the confession is the inducement made to the defendant — was there any promise or threat made to the defendant which would elicit a false confession”
- stating that “the key to the ‘free and voluntary’ character of the confession is the inducement made to the defendant—was there any promise or threat made to the defendant [that] would elicit a false confession”
- holding, based on an extensive review of Oregon case law, that confessions are “initially deemed to be involuntary and the burden is upon the state to prove that it was voluntary”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
JONES, J.,
concurring.
I write separately only to point out that in State v. Mains, 295 Or 640 , 669 P2d 1112 (1983), this court, in discussing the necessity for warnings, was dealing with a case *702 in which the defendant had been arraigned, had been appointed counsel, was in full custody and was ordered to respond to questions by a state-appointed psychiatrist. Under those circumstances, and in the absence of legislation, we held that in order to effectuate the guarantee of Article I, section 12, of the Oregon Constitution, a defendant may not be compelled to testify against himself in a criminal prosecution and Miranda-type warnings should be given to the defendant by the psychiatrist.
In State v. Sparklin, 296 Or 85 , 672 P2d 1182 (1983), again the defendant had been arraigned, had requested an attorney, was in full custody, had been given warnings as set forth in the Miranda case and had signed a waiver of his rights. The defendant in that case argued that the federal Miranda warnings were inadequate to protect his Article I, section 12, rights. We held that they were adequate.
Both Mains and Sparklin involved full custody interrogations—the type that most concerned Chief Justice Warren when he wrote the original Miranda opinion some 20 years ago. The present case involves statements that were made before any formal arrest, before any physical custody, before arraignment and before appointment of counsel. The specific holdings of Mains and Sparklin remain viable and are not affected by the plurality opinion in this case.