holding that a school district had a duty to a student who was injured by a motorcycle off campus where the school failed to supervise the student and he wandered off
How later courts described this case
- holding that a school district had a duty to a student who was injured by a motorcycle off campus where the school failed to supervise the student and he wandered off
- ‘‘the duty to supervise school children is imposed in large part in recognition of the fact that, without such supervision, students will not always con- duct themselves in accordance with school rules or as safely as they ought to’’
- rejecting argument that off-campus consequences of on-campus supervisory lapses are beyond the range of duty
- school could be held liable for injury that occurred on the way to or from school if breach of its duty to supervise students while on school premises proximately caused the injury
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
RICHARDSON, J.
I respectfully dissent and, agreeing with the reasoning and conclusions of Justice Clark in his dissent, only wish to add the following.
As a policy.matter I oppose the imposition of civil liability upon a school district for injuries sustained off the school premises by a truant school pupil who has voluntarily and knowingly left the school premises during school hours. In my view, the fastening of liability on a school under these circumstances goes too far. Just 10 years ago in Dillon v. Legg (1968) 68 Cal.2d 728 [ 69 Cal.Rptr. 72 , 441 P.2d 912 , 29 A.L.R.3d 1316 ], at page 734, we repeated the wise admonition of Dean Prosser that whether a duty of care exists turns on “ ‘. . . whether the plaintiff’s interests are entitled to legal protection against the defendant’s conduct.... “Duty” is not sacrosanct in itself, but only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection.’ (Prosser, Law of Torts, supra [3d ed. 1964], atpp. 332-333.)” (Italics added.)
These “considerations of policy” in the case before us should, among other things, include the fundamental function, purpose, and role of a school and its staff, the nature and probable degree of supervision required to prevent truancy, the physical variables of entrances and exits to school grounds, the financial costs of adequate supervision to prevent truancy, the relative moral culpability of pupil, parent, and school administration, the historical experience of schools in the supervision of pupils, truant and nontruant, the expense of adequate insurance to cover the extension of liability herein, and other factors. Weighing these different considerations, I conclude that for policy reasons we should not impose such a duty of care on a school district. A line should be drawn *528 limiting a school’s liability to injuries to a pupil which occur on school property, or when the pupil is transported to, or participating in, a school-sponsored or school-related activity, in the manner contemplated by Education Code section 44808 (formerly § 13557.5).
The instant case involved a truant who was injured at an intersection four blocks from the schoolyard by a third party motorcyclist. I cannot say that the next case may not involve a truant who without anyone’s permission or knowledge deliberately slipped away from school unnoticed, hopped a freight train and was injured when he fell off a car four days later in Duluth, Minnesota.
We should recognize that some children’s activities are not risk-proof. One of the continuing hazards, by reason of the very nature of a school’s operations, is that a school child during school hours, purposely and surreptitiously may escape from the schoolyard and the school environment and run off on a lark of his own and thereby be injured. If this happens, the event is unfortunate—perhaps tragic—indeed, but I would not require that the liability protection of a school district must, like a shadow, follow the youngster as he wanders around town.
I believe this is what the Legislature had in mind in its enactment of Education Code section 44808 (formerly 13557.5).
Mosk, J., concurred.
Respondent’s petition for a rehearing was denied December 20, 1978. Mosk, J., Clark, J., and Richardson, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.