constitutional error may be found harmless if the Court finds, beyond a reasonable doubt, that it did not contribute to verdict
How later courts described this case
- constitutional error may be found harmless if the Court finds, beyond a reasonable doubt, that it did not contribute to verdict
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
CHAPEL, P.J.,
concurring in part/dissenting in part:
¶ 11 agree that this case must be remanded for resentencing. However, I cannot agree that Stephen Vann White’s absence from his competency trial is harmless error. In Oklahoma, by statute a defendant is guaranteed the right to be personally present at each step of his trial if he is being prosecuted for a felony. 1 This includes the right to be present at one’s competency trial. 2
¶ 2 In this case, defense counsel agreed to conduct the final day of the competency trial and receive the verdict in White’s absence solely for the convenience of the Okmulgee County Sheriff. Nowhere on the record does it reflect that White participated or even acquiesced in this waiver of his right to be present. Thus, continuing his trial in his absence was an egregious violation of Oklahoma law. And as the majority points out, the right to be present at one’s trial is not only statutory, but also a constitutional right. 3 Accordingly, I find White’s absence also violated his State and Federal rights to Due Process of law. 4
¶ 3 Up to this point, I am in full agreement with the majority. Error occurred, both statutory and constitutional. Where we part ways is in the determination that this error was harmless. The majority does a cursory analysis of the issue and decides White was not prejudiced. If this were the sole consideration, the constitutional and statutory guarantees that an accused must be present at all critical stages of trial would be rendered meaningless as long as there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction.
¶ 4 While most of the time we deem errors “harmless” when it can be said beyond a reasonable doubt that they did not affect the outcome of the trial, this cannot be the sole determining factor in whether relief is warranted. The question is whether the error *277 affected “substantial rights” of the parties. 5 Otherwise, errors like the one at issue here would always be harmless, since the evidence presented and thus the outcome of the trial would have been the same regardless of the defendant’s presence. Accordingly, I would hold the defendant’s absence without his consent deprived him of a substantial right and reverse this matter for a new competency trial.
. 22 O.S.1981, § 583; Humphrey v. State, 3 Okl. Cr. 504, 106 P. 978, 979 (1910).
. 22 O.S.1991, § 1175.4(C) ("The person whose competency is in question shall have the right to be present ....") (emphasis added).
. Clark v. State, 718 P.2d 375, 377 (Okl.Cr.1986) ("It is well settled that a defendant has both a statutory and a constitutional right to be present at all stages of his trial.”).
.Okla Const, art. II, § 7; Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 117 , 104 S.Ct. 453, 455 , 78 L.Ed.2d 267 (1983) ("... the right to personal presence at all critical stages of the trial and the right to counsel are fundamental rights of each criminal defendant."); Snyder v. Com. of Mass., 291 U.S. 97, 107 , 54 S.Ct. 330, 333 , 78 L.Ed. 674 (1934) (Fourteenth Amendment due process right to presence).
. 20 O.S.1991, § 3001.1; Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 . 23. 87 S.Ct. 824 . 827. 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967).