holding that first-degree felony murder includes “a variety of unintended homicides resulting from reckless behavior, or ordinary negligence, or pure accident; it embraces both calculated conduct and acts committed in panic or rage, or under the dominion of mental illness, drugs, or alcohol; and it condemns alike consequences that are highly probable, conceivably possible, or wholly unforeseeable.”
How later courts described this case
- holding that first-degree felony murder includes “a variety of unintended homicides resulting from reckless behavior, or ordinary negligence, or pure accident; it embraces both calculated conduct and acts committed in panic or rage, or under the dominion of mental illness, drugs, or alcohol; and it condemns alike consequences that are highly probable, conceivably possible, or wholly unforeseeable.”
- holding a seventeen year-old's sentence of life imprisonment for felony murder was unconstitutional as applied where the offender fatally shot his victim out of fear for his life in the course of trying to steal marijuana plants from the victim's farm when the victim-who had previously made threats about shooting the defendant for being on his property-began approaching the defendant with a shotgun in his possession.
- holding the felony-murder rule does not create a conclusive presumption of the existence of an element of the crime in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment since malice aforethought is not an element of felony murder
- concluding that the plainer the intent to commit the offense, the more likely that steps taken in the early stages of the commission of the crime will satisfy the overt act requirement
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Abrogated on other grounds by People v. Chun, 45 Cal. 4th 1172 (2009)
34 Cal.3d 441, 478-479 (Dillon), abrogated on another ground, as stated in People v. Chun (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1172, 1186
Superseded by statute, as recognized in People v. Chun
34 Cal.3d 441, 478 (Dillon), superseded by statute on another ground as stated in People v. Chun (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1172, 1186
Distinguished
Distinguished by People v. Stankewitz, 51 Cal. 3d 72 (1990)
Dillon, however, is plainly distinguishable.
Distinguished by People v. Rose, 182 Cal. App. 3d 813 (1986)
Dillon, supra, 34 Cal.3d 441, is readily distinguishable from the case at bar.
Distinguished by People v. Munoz, 157 Cal. App. 3d 999 (1984)
) Beyond this point we part company with Dillon.
The opinion
REYNOSO, J.
I concur in the result.
Generally, the role of a high court is to settle the law. That is, we are a court which sets decisional policy, not a court which corrects error. Accordingly, we have an institutional duty to speak with a voice which can be followed by the courts of this state. Too many separate opinions, more often than not, confuse decisional law. The case at bench, unlike most decisions demands separate opinions so that the bench and bar may know which of the distinct sections commands a majority.
I write separately only to indicate the sections in which I concur, and those sections in which I concur only in the result.
I concur with sections I, II and V. The conduct indeed went beyond preparation—it was an attempt, as section I correctly concludes. And section II realistically reasons that a crop can be the object of a robbery. Finally, section V correctly applies In re Lynch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 410 [ 105 Cal.Rptr. 217 , 503 P.2d 921 ]. The remaining sections (III and IV) include discussion regarding the felony-murder rule which causes me grave concern; while I agree with the result, I am not in entire agreement with the reasoning. Accordingly, I concur only in the result.