holding as an alternative ground for considering a challenge to an expired city ordinance that “we believe a case involving the public financing and limiting of campaign expenditures for political candidates is of such public importance there is ‘continuing and substantial public interest’ ”
How later courts described this case
- holding as an alternative ground for considering a challenge to an expired city ordinance that “we believe a case involving the public financing and limiting of campaign expenditures for political candidates is of such public importance there is ‘continuing and substantial public interest’ ”
- asserting that a different fourth factor exists; the likelihood issues in short-lived controversies will escape review
- publicly funded campaign assistance was an entitlement and not a gift of public funds
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Williams, C.J.
(dissenting) — I agree with the first portion of Justice Rosellini's dissent that the issue of the *249 validity of Seattle's campaign financing ordinances is moot. I also agree with Justice Rosellini that this is not the type of situation, such as that presented by Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 , 35 L. Ed. 2d 147 , 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973) or Federated Publications, Inc. v. Kurtz, 94 Wn.2d 51 , 615 P.2d 440 (1980), that involves matters of continuing and substantial public interest which may escape effective appellate review. Although the purposes underlying the campaign financing ordinances are laudable, I believe we should refrain from rendering a wholly advisory opinion in this matter until we have a valid enactment before us that has been briefed and argued by the proper parties in interest, including representative citizens of the City of Seattle. I therefore agree with Justice Rosellini that it is both inappropriate and unwise to reach the merits of this case despite its mootness.
I wish to make it clear, however, that I do not join in Justice Rosellini's discussion on the invalidity of the Seattle campaign financing ordinances on the basis of Const, art. 8, § 7, pertaining to the prohibition on gifts of public funds to private individuals. I would reserve any ruling on the validity of future campaign financing measures until the issue is squarely before this court.
I dissent.
Brachtenbach, J., concurs with Williams, C.J.