determining that, although the literal language of the rule states that a motion to dismiss is converted to a motion for summary judgment if matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the trial court, where the parties restricted their argument to the allegations of the amended complaint and did not purport to rely on attachments, and the trial court and the parties treated the motion as simply a motion to dismiss, appellate court will not decide the case on grounds not relied on by the trial court but will treat the motion as a motion to dismiss
How later courts described this case
- determining that, although the literal language of the rule states that a motion to dismiss is converted to a motion for summary judgment if matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the trial court, where the parties restricted their argument to the allegations of the amended complaint and did not purport to rely on attachments, and the trial court and the parties treated the motion as simply a motion to dismiss, appellate court will not decide the case on grounds not relied on by the trial court but will treat the motion as a motion to dismiss
- stating the same and adding that “maintaining public order should be understood as encompassing only duties traditionally performed by law enforcement officers.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)
- holding that medical investigator and crime laboratory technician are not “law enforcement officers”
- determining that the plaintiff’s submission of nearly 400 pages of attachments in his response to the defendants’ motion to dismiss did not convert the motion into one for summary judgment
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
BUSTAMANTE, Judge (concurring).
{28} I concur in Judge Hartz’ opinion. I write separately because I am concerned that our case law interpreting Section 41-4-3(B) has unduly narrowed the concept of law enforcement under the Tort Claims Act. Our case law reflects an outdated model of the law enforcement officer as the “cop on the beat.” See Coyazo v. State, 120 N.M. 47, 49 , 897 P.2d 234, 237 (Ct.App.1995). Focussing too narrowly on the activities of commissioned officers on the street creates the risk of missing a large portion of the law enforcement function today. The business of solving and proving crime is increasingly a technical pursuit. Mrs. Dunn’s death is a case in point. The decision to arrest and prosecute had little to do with the activities one normally imagines with pursuit and arrest on the street. Rather, it turned largely on the result of a scientific evaluation of technical aspects of the body and the death scene. If a technical investigation is handled recklessly — or is wantonly perverted — an improper prosecution can ensue as surely as if an officer on the street chooses to arrest and prosecute without reasonable suspicion or probable cause. There is no reason why the concept of “law enforcement officer” under the Tort Claims Act should not reach the technical, investigatory side of the law enforcement house.