holding that “the prosecutor may not argue that the absence of a mitigating factor constitutes the presence of an aggravating factor”
How later courts described this case
- holding that “the prosecutor may not argue that the absence of a mitigating factor constitutes the presence of an aggravating factor”
- requiring exhaustion of peremptory challenges and communication to the trial court that the defendant is dissatisfied with the jury selected
- "Nonetheless, as we previously have recognized, subsequent to the adoption of article I, section 28, subdivision (d
- "Nonetheless, as we previously have recognized, subsequent to the adoption of article I, section 28, subdivision (d) of the California Constitution, we apply federal standards in reviewing a defendant's claim that his or her statements were elicited in violation of Miranda."
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled on other grounds by People v. Yeoman, 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d 186 (2003)
9 Cal.4th 83, 139, fn. 13 , overruled on another ground in People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93
The opinion
MOSK, J.
I concur in the judgment and generally in the opinion that Justice George has prepared for the court.
I write separately to make this statement. I have not been persuaded by defendant that the 1978 death penalty law, as it was originally enacted, violated the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, on its face or as applied to him, by failing to properly define the class of persons subject to the ultimate sanction. I do not, however, arrive at a more positive conclusion. Certainly, the law, as it has subsequently been construed (see, e.g., People v. Morales (1989) 48 Cal.3d 527, 554-557 [ 257 Cal.Rptr. 64 , 770 P.2d 244 ]) and amended (initiative measure (Prop. 114), approved, Primary Elec. (June 5, 1990); initiative measure (Prop. 115), approved, Primary Elec. (June 5, 1990)), has become problematic. Whether it now contravenes the Eighth Amendment in its definition of death-eligibility is a question I need not and do not reach.
Appellant’s petition for a rehearing was denied February 16,1995, and the opinion was modified to read as printed above.