summary judgment appropriate when the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and admissions on file demonstrate absence of any genuine issues of material fact and that moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law
How later courts described this case
- summary judgment appropriate when the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and admissions on file demonstrate absence of any genuine issues of material fact and that moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law
- "A summary judgment motion under CR 56(c) can be granted only if the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and admissions on file demonstrate there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.... The court must consider all facts submitted and all reasonable inferences from the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party."
- summary judgment is not appropriate when reasonable minds might reach different conclusions
- deferring factual decisions to trier of fact by taking reasonable inferences in light most favorable to nonmoving party
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Utter, J.
(concurring)—For reasons set forth in the majority opinion, there has been a failure of admissible proof that the minor decedent was affected by consumption of alcohol served at the Steinbach home. Had the proof been sufficient, I would reach a result different from that favored by the majority.
In 1966 this court in Halvorson v. Birchfield Boiler, Inc., 76 Wn.2d 759, 765 , 458 P.2d 897 (1969) decided " [i]t may be that the social and economic consequences of 'mixing gasoline and liquor' should lead to a rule of accountability by those who furnish intoxicants to one who becomes a tort-feasor by reason of intoxication, but such a policy decision should be made by the legislature after full investigation, debate and examination of the relative merits of the conflicting positions."
The dissent in that case is more persuasive to me. The dissent noted, at page 768:
Legislation is not required and never has been. The instant case is one peculiarly suited to the judicial process. The ever-growing carnage on our highways is notorious. So is the relation between drunken driving and accidents. Plaintiff has alleged a clear and compelling factual case for foreseeable negligent harm, and this lawsuit is in that posture where inferences drawn from the allegations must be those most favorable to the plaintiff.
It requires no legislative fact-finding to establish that risk-creating conduct existed on the facts alleged. Legislative inaction is not proof of inexorable social or public policy. ... If that determination is consistent with the analytic framework of the law of torts, it is legitimate and should be effectuated modernly in this appellate *443 court.
The author of the dissent then proceeds to frame the issue as whether the common law right of action for negligence should be abridged by judicially created barrier to recovery, and states, at page 770:
It should be clear to any responsible citizen that automobile accidents of the sort upon which this suit is brought are the foreseeable result of furnishing drink to alcoholic drivers, if not perhaps the foreseeable result of furnishing excessive drink to anyone driving a high-powered modern automobile on a public thoroughfare. The majority's denial of liability is based on its own reasoning as to social policy, which I believe is unnecessarily limited.
Needless to say, I find this language and the rest of the dissent persuasive and, if the facts proven in this case were sufficient, I would adopt the position of the four dissenters in Halvorson and hold a common law right of recovery could and should be found to exist in this case.