holding that, for “the 3 purposes of the case before us, ‘administrator’ and ‘personal representative’ are one 4 and the same” and noting that the plaintiff, “as ‘personal representative,’ was also 5 ancillary administratrix with the will annexed”
How later courts described this case
- holding that, for “the 3 purposes of the case before us, ‘administrator’ and ‘personal representative’ are one 4 and the same” and noting that the plaintiff, “as ‘personal representative,’ was also 5 ancillary administratrix with the will annexed”
- holding that, for “the purposes of the case before us, ‘administrator’ and ‘personal representative’ are one and the same” and noting that the plaintiff, “as ‘personal representative,’ was also ancillary administratrix with the will annexed”
- “the measure of damages for wrongful death is the worth of life of decedent to the estate”
- “Damages are recoverable by proof of the worth of the life of the decedent, even though there is no kin to receive the award.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
WATSON, Justice (concurring in part, dissenting in part).
While I agree with the majority that substantial damages for the death may be recovered under the statute even though no pecuniary damages result to the beneficiary, I cannot agree that recovery can he had for pain and suffering and medical and hospital expenses for the following reasons:
(1) The Act does not authorize such damages. Section 22-20-3, N.M.S.A., 1953 Comp., only provides for consideration of pecuniary injuries resulting from the death to the surviving parties and mitigating or aggravating circumstances attending the wrongful act.
(2) Cerrillos Coal Railroad Co. v. Deserant, 9 N.M. 49 , 49 P. 807 (1897), the only New Mexico case in point, excludes damages for pain and suffering. I would not disavow it.
(3) Our Wrongful Death Act, particularly with the 1961 amendment stating that the cause of action accrues on the date of death, is now clearly a death act rather than a survival act. Compare, Chase v. Fitzgerald, 132 Conn. 461 , 45 A.2d 789 (1946); Kling v. Torello, 87 Conn. 301 , 87 A. 987 (1913); Connecticut Public Acts, 1903, Ch. 193, §§ 1 and 2; Mitchell v. Akers, 401 S.W.2d 907 (Tex.Civ.App.1966); Texas Stat., Art. 5525, V.A.C.S. (survival), and Art. 4671, V.A.C.S. (death) ; Cummins v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 334 Mo. 672 , 66 S.W.2d 920 (1933), where the Missouri statute similar to ours is compared with Lord Campbell’s Act, St. 9 to 10, Viet., the first death act. See Baca v. Baca, 71 N.M. 468 , 379 P.2d 765 (1963); State ex rel. DeMoss v. District Court of Sixth Judicial Dist, 55 N.M. 135 , 227 P.2d 937 (1951).
(4) Reason directs that the legislature would not permit unaccountable recovery by the personal representative for medical and hospital expenses which the executor or administrator must pay.