finding 8 intentional infliction of emotional distress where, as a result of the defendant doctor’s 9 actions, the plaintiff was required to helplessly witness “the terrifying agony and explicit 10 pain and suffering of his wife while she proceeded to die right in front of his 11 eyes . . . because of his inability to secure any medical care or treatment for his wife”
How later courts described this case
- finding 8 intentional infliction of emotional distress where, as a result of the defendant doctor’s 9 actions, the plaintiff was required to helplessly witness “the terrifying agony and explicit 10 pain and suffering of his wife while she proceeded to die right in front of his 11 eyes . . . because of his inability to secure any medical care or treatment for his wife”
- finding outrage where, as a result of the defendant doctor’s actions, the plaintiff was required to helplessly witness “the terrifying agony and explicit pain and suffering of his wife while she proceeded to die right in *391 front of his eyes . . . because of his inability to secure any medical care or treatment for his wife” (emphasis omitted)
- allowing claim to 9 proceed where plaintiff pleaded he had to “witness the terrifying agony and explicit pain 10 and suffering of his wife while she [p]roceeded to die right in front of his eyes” as a result 11 of doctor’s failure to provide medical care
- allowing claim to proceed where plaintiff pleaded he had to “witness the 5 terrifying agony and explicit pain and suffering of his wife while she [p]roceeded to die 6 right in front of his eyes” as a result of doctor’s failure to provide medical care
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Utter, J.
(concurring) — I concur with the majority. I do not, however, join in its unnecessary rejection of the rule of Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728 , 441 P.2d 912 (1968). Since we hold that appellant is able to recover on a theory of the tort of outrage, and thus that his complaint does state a cause of action, we need not and should not comment on the Dillon rule in this case.
Were the Dillon rule necessarily at issue in this case, I would follow it. The reasons for rejecting it seem to me to echo those advanced for refusing to allow recovery for the tort of outrage. As the majority finds, neither are persuasive considering the established ability of trial courts to define causation and foreseeability on a case-by-case basis. *61 The Supreme Court of Hawaii has recently recognized the vitality of the Dillon rule and applied and extended it in a case where a 10-year-old boy allegedly suffered severe mental distress when he witnessed the death of his step-grandmother who was struck by a car in a crosswalk. Leong v. Takasaki, __ Hawaii__, 520 P.2d 758 (1974). As the court there noted, courts in Rhode Island, Virginia and Michigan have also recently followed California’s lead. D’Ambra v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 810 (D.R.I. 1973), modified on other grounds, 481 F.2d 14 (1st Cir. 1973); Hughes v. Moore, 214 Va. 27, 34 , 197 S.E.2d 214, 219 (1973); Toms v. McConnell, 45 Mich. App. 647, 657 , 207 N.W.2d 140 (1973).