“In construing a statute ‘we begin with the fundamental rule that a court should ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law’ ” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)
How later courts described this case
- “In construing a statute ‘we begin with the fundamental rule that a court should ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law’ ” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)
- legislator’s statement is admissible only when it is a reiteration of legislative discussion and events leading to adoption of proposed legislation, rather than merely an expression of personal opinion or motive
- "A legislator's statement is entitled to consideration . . . when it is a reiteration of legislative discussion and events leading to adoption of proposed amendments rather than merely an expression of personal opinion."
- "In construing a statute we do not consider the motives or understandings of individual legislators who cast their votes in favor of it."
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
BIRD, C. J.
I respectfully dissent.
Only three short months ago this court bottomed its interpretation of a section of the California Constitution on the written declaration of 1 member of an 80-member commission some 14 years after the event! (See Stanton v. Panish (1980) 28 Cal.3d 107 [ 167 Cal.Rptr. 584 , 615 P.2d 1372 ].) Today, this court holds that a declaration by the author of legislation sent to the Governor, which outlines the intent of the legislation and urges the Governor to sign it, is “not a proper subject for consideration in determining the Legislature’s intent...” (Maj. opn., at p. 710.) Ah, “consistency thou art a jewel.”
I agree with my colleague, Justice Newman, that the rule promulgated today will only “lead us to the kinds of vagaries and absurdities that the discredited rule helped effect.” (Cone, opn., above.)
The issue before the court is the proper method of computing the retroactive compensation due instructors ordered reclassified and reemployed as permanent employees. Section 13503.1 (now recodified as § 45025) provides that “[i]n fixing the compensation of part-time employees, governing boards shall provide an amount which bears the same ratio to the amount provided full-time employees as the time actually served by such part-time employees bears to the time actually served by full-time employees of the same grade or assignment.” (Italics added.)
As the unanimous opinion of Justice Howard Wiener of the Court of Appeal recognized, “[t]he statute, in furnishing the answer to the method of compensating part-time employees also creates the problem for the phrase ‘time actually served’ is wonderfully ambiguous.” As a re- *711 suit, the statement by the bill’s author in a letter to the Governor, becomes important in determining legislative intent. The Senator wrote that “‘[t]his legislation would provide that part-time employees shall be paid on the basis that the proportion of the time actually served bares [¿ic] to the minimum schoolday as provided in law, thereby proportional to the amount of state income received. [11] Inasmuch as every school district may determine the amount of time required of full-time employees, there is a lack of consistency as to the basis upon which part-time employees may be paid. Under current law, it is possible for a school district to receive the equivalent state income generated by a full-time teacher while paying that teacher on a part-time basis. The effect of this bill would be to make the proportional ratio of salary payments to part-time employees based upon and consistent with the amount of state income they generate by their teaching activities', it would make such application consistent throughout the state.’” (Italics added.)
The Court of Appeal opinion goes on to point out that “[t]he income of the community college system is based on a set sum of dollars per pupil in average daily attendance (§ 17301.12, currently § 14020). Average daily attendance units are computed by multiplying the weekly student contact hours of enrollment by statewide factors established by the Board of Governors of the California Community Colleges. (§ 11475, currently § 84520.) The term ‘contact hours’ means in-class time. Thus, a part-timer teaching thirty students three class hours a week earns the same amount of state money for the college as would a full-time instructor teaching the same class. [If] Since the object of section 13503.1.. .was to pay part-timers a pro rata salary consistent with the amount of state income they generated by their teaching activities, the basis for their salaries should be the number of ‘contact hours’ they teach. On that basis, the phrase ‘time actually served’ means time spent in the classroom.”
This court’s holding is contrary to the Legislature’s intent in amending the statute. The majority opinion includes in the “time actually served” concept, the hours spent in counseling, in supervising student activities, etc. These are included because they are duties full-time teachers must fulfill. However, the Legislature specifically amended the statute to eliminate “time required” and replace it with a formula more reflective of revenue-generating hours worked.
*712 The majority’s definition of “time actually served,” which includes time for those “duties” that are done outside of the classroom setting, closely approximates the standard eliminated by the Legislature. For example, the district argues that full-time teachers must spend 30 hours on campus, while part-time teachers need not do so. The majority’s approach would allow as many of those 30 hours as were actually spent on the campus, even though none of those hours would produce revenue for the district.
The district does not claim that the phrase, “time actually served,” can be interpreted as anything other than classroom time for part-time teachers. The time these teachers spend counseling their students, explaining grades, reviewing papers or other incidental activities tied to their teaching functions has never been included by the district. Yet, when the court has the task of defining the very same term as applied to full-time teachers, it arrives at a totally different meaning for no apparent reason.
The majority opinion recognizes that “time actually served” must mean the same thing for part-time and full-time teachers. Thus, the majority requires the district to consider the “total amount of time spent by part and full-time teachers in connection with their teaching.” (Ante, at p. 702.) It is unclear, however, what is included for part-timers.
The district asserts that part-time teachers do not have any duties outside the classroom. When a part-time teacher spends time reviewing an examination or paper with a student after class, is that time to be considered by the district or not? The majority opinion implies that it is. However, this ignores the fact that the district may have contracted only for the part-time teacher’s class time. If the term “time actually served” is to fairly reflect (1) the hours spent in connection with teaching responsibilities for both part- and full-time teachers, and (2) the revenue-generating proportion intended by the Legislature, the only logical interpretation of the term is limited to classroom responsibilities. 1
*713 Therefore, the proper measure for determining back pay here, as the Court of Appeal correctly determined, is “the number of classroom hours [taught by part-timers] as compared to the number of classroom hours taught by full-time teachers.” Since the majority opinion does not use this method, I must respectfully dissent since the Legislature’s intent has not been followed.
The district and several amici suggest that the Court of Appeal’s resolution of this issue would necessarily affect the full-time teacher’s contract which includes nonclassroom hours. The sole issue before the court is how to calculate the part-time teacher’s compensation under Education Code section 13503.1. The court’s holding would not affect full-timers’ assignments or compensation under either formula.
Additionally, the court’s holding today will not affect the application of section 13503.1 to nonteaching certificated employees. The statute plainly requires comparison of time served by employees “of the same grade or assignment.” (Ed. Code, § 13503.1.)