holding that Faretta “did not establish a game in which a defendant can engage in a series of machinations, with one misstep by the court resulting in a reversal of an otherwise fair trial,” or “a charade in which a defendant can continually manipulate the proceedings in the hope of eventually injecting reversible error into the case no matter how the court rules”
How later courts described this case
- holding that Faretta “did not establish a game in which a defendant can engage in a series of machinations, with one misstep by the court resulting in a reversal of an otherwise fair trial,” or “a charade in which a defendant can continually manipulate the proceedings in the hope of eventually injecting reversible error into the case no matter how the court rules”
- treating physician’s report of victim’s injuries, with medical conclusions redacted
- "[I]t is a matter of common experience that the ability to remember a perceptive experience diminishes over time. It is also generally known that voices may sound slightly different through different media."
- revoking defendant's pro se status when defendant chose to stand mute for the rest of trial
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled on other grounds by People v. Pearson, 56 Cal. 4th 393 (2013)
3 Cal.4th 41 (Clark), abrogated on other grounds as stated in People v. Pearson (2013) 56 Cal.4th 393, 462
Abrogated on other grounds by The People v. Edwards, 57 Cal. 4th 658 (2013)
3 Cal.4th 41, 173 , abrogated on another ground as stated in People v. Edwards (2013) 57 Cal.4th 658
Abrogated on other grounds by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004)
3 Cal.4th 41, 173 , abrogated on other grounds in Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36
The opinion
MOSK, J.
I dissent. Justice was not served by the trial court proceedings.
This case illustrates the futility of self-representation in a death penalty case. It was unfortunate that Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 [ 45 L.Ed.2d 562 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 ]—a noncapital case—in recognizing a general right of self-representation did not distinguish between mere traffic infractions and the heightened requirement of cases in which the issue is life or death. In the latter, both the state and the defendant have the responsibility of presenting all available evidence, for and against the death penalty or life without possibility of parole. Defendant may not frustrate that duty by silence as in this case, by gamesmanship as in People v. Bloom (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1194, 1234 [ 259 Cal.Rptr. 669, 774 P.2d 698 ] (dis. opn. of Mosk, J.), or by prohibiting counsel to present evidence as in People v. Deere (1985) 41 Cal.3d 353, 361 [ 222 Cal.Rptr. 13 , 710 P.2d 925 ].
I must repeat the admonition given to trial courts and counsel in Deere : when the people of California are being asked to take a human life, every aspect of the case must be presented to and considered by the jury in a genuine adversary proceeding. Self-representation by a marginally equipped defendant seldom serves that end. If there is the slightest doubt of the knowledge and abilities of the defendant to effectively duel with the skilled prosecutor, the trial court should deny self-representation at the very outset. Such a doubt—which certainly arose here—precludes the threshold determination required by Faretta , viz., that the defendant has “voluntarily and intelligently elect[ed] to” proceed without counsel. ( 422 U.S. at p. 807 [ 45 L.Ed.2d at p. 566 ].)
Since the trial court did not deny self-representation in this case, I would reverse the judgment.