"[r]elevant evidence encompasses facts that present both direct and circumstantial evidence of any element of a claim or defense"
How later courts described this case
- "[r]elevant evidence encompasses facts that present both direct and circumstantial evidence of any element of a claim or defense"
- "An essential element of second degree assault is specific intent either to cause bodily harm or to create apprehension of bodily harm.”
- "To show diminished capacity, a criminal defendant must produce expert testimony demonstrating the defendant suffered from a mental condition that impaired his or her ability to form the requisite specific intent."
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Guy, J.
(concurring) — Defendant has two means to introduce evidence of his peacefulness. First, he can introduce it as traditional character evidence — "because I have the reputation for being peaceful, I could not have specifically intended to assault the victim.” Justice Tal *504 madge argues that the claim of diminished capacity "breaks any possible inferential chain linking peacefulness to his intent or state of mind at the relevant time.” Dissent, at 510. I agree. How could evidence of your normal state of mind be relevant if you are claiming you were temporarily out of your mind?
However, a defendant can introduce such evidence as proof of the extent of his diminished capacity. This is not character evidence per se. Rather, the testimony is elicited to describe what the defendant was like before he became delusional. Evidence of peacefulness could create a baseline from which the trier of fact could measure diminished capacity. Because the Defendant does not seek to introduce evidence of peacefulness to prove he acted "in conformity therewith,” ER 404(a) does not apply. Instead, the court weighs admission of the testimony by examining whether the evidence is relevant (ER 401) and whether its probative value outweighs any prejudicial effect (ER 403).
With this second means of admission, testimony of defendant’s peacefulness would not be subject to the test established in State v. Stumpf, 64 Wn. App. 522 , 827 P.2d 294 (1992). The rule in Stumpf concerns lay testimony which corroborates an expert’s diagnosis of a mental disorder. Evidence of peacefulness does not prove the disorder; it establishes defendant’s state of mind prior to the onset of such a condition. Therefore, the Court of Appeals test in Stumpf does not apply to the introduction of this evidence.
Defendant’s proof is admissible not as character evidence but rather as evidence relevant to measure the extent of his diminished capacity. On this basis, the evidence was admissible and should not have been excluded. The court may limit the repetitiousness of the testimony if such be the situation. I concur with the result of the majority.